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A SHARED STRUGGLE FOR TRUTH AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
CANADA, EUROPE AND INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD 





The Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar 
(‘O’Connor inquiry’) and the Internal Inquiry into the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation 
to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (‘Iacobucci inquiry’) were 
established by the Canadian government to examine Canadian involvement in the detention and 
torture of four citizens abroad. These inquiries have been both lauded and criticised, and remain 
virtually unique among nations that – like Canada – are trying to come to terms with government 
complicity towards the mistreatment of its citizens.  
At a time when different kinds of investigations are being conducted in several European 
countries, it can be instructive to review the Canadian experience with these two particular 
inquiries. As Kent Roach wrote in the context of the O’Connor inquiry, “the work of the Arar 
Commission is significant not only for Canada, but for all democracies that are dealing with 
vigorous whole government strategies to combat international terror”.
1  
Detail 
First, this report explains the context in which these inquiries occurred. Both Canada and 
European nations are struggling with the pressure and desire to cooperate in an effective fight 
against terrorism, and have shown that in the process the rights of their citizens and the 
fundamental values central to these countries have not always been protected. Mr Arar, Mr 
Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin are all victims of the actions of Canadian officials in the 
years following the 11 September 2001 attacks when an emphasis on cooperation and 
information sharing eclipsed the importance of the duty to protect the rights of Canadian 
citizens. 
Second, it highlights some of the notable costs that have arisen throughout the inquiry process, 
which continue to grow. The facts revealed by the inquiries have come with heavy monetary, 
reputational and political costs. 
Third, the report reviews the findings of the two inquiries. We can use the truth – the stories of 
the four Canadians – revealed by the inquiries to highlight themes that may arise in any country 
involved in the fight against terrorism. The inquiries fulfilled their respective mandates by 
examining the actions of Canadian officials and making, in the case of the O’Connor inquiry, 
significant and detailed policy recommendations. These findings laid forth a reliable and detailed 
account of what Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin endured, and confirmed 
                                                      
* Lindsay Aagaard is a gradute of Queen’s University and McGill University’s Faculty of Law, and will be 
articling at a firm in Toronto. 
1 Kent Roach, “Review and Oversight of National Security Activities and some Reflections on Canada’s 
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that they were all subjected to torture abroad. The findings of these inquiries are important to 
note, as they reveal in detail the serious consequences that can arise when international 
cooperation occurs to the detriment of the safety of individual citizens. 
Fourth, there are several advantages and disadvantages of the commission of inquiry model, all 
of which should be considered when evaluating how best to hold governments to account for 
their actions in relation to the detention and mistreatment of their citizens. Of particular interest 
are the challenges faced by the two inquiries concerning claims of confidentiality for national 
security.  
2. The  story 
The two inquiries at the centre of this paper were established by the Canadian government and 
charged with examining the events relating to the detention and mistreatment of four Canadian 
men. The first of these, the O’Connor inquiry, dealt with the experience of Mr Arar. The 
Iacobucci inquiry started immediately after the release of the first of Commissioner Dennis 
O’Connor’s two reports, and focused on events surrounding the ordeals of Mr Almalki, Mr 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin.  
2.1 Personal  stories 
Mr Arar immigrated to Canada from Syria and became a Canadian citizen in 1991. He lived in 
Ottawa with his family, and worked as a wireless technology consultant. Mr Arar was detained 
in New York City in 2002 on his way back to Canada after a vacation, and was sent to Syria by 
American officials.  
Mr Elmaati immigrated to Canada from Kuwait as a teenager and became a Canadian citizen in 
1986. His father was born in Egypt, and as a result Mr Elmaati holds both Canadian and 
Egyptian citizenship. He worked as a truck driver, and married in Syria in April 2001. He was 
returning to Syria in November 2001 in order legalise this marriage (it had been celebrated with 
only a traditional ceremony earlier in the year) when he was detained.  
Mr Almalki immigrated to Canada from Syria when he was 16 years old and became a Canadian 
citizen in 1991. He and his wife lived in Ottawa with their children, and ran an electronics export 
business. Mr Almalki was travelling for business when he was detained in Syria in 2002.  
Finally, Mr Nureddin was born in Iraq and he later immigrated to Canada and became a 
Canadian citizen. He worked as a geologist and lived in Ontario; he was detained while crossing 
into Syria from Iraq in late 2003. 
2.2 Investigations 
Before being detained overseas in Syria, all four men were ‘known’ to the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Yet, it must be 
noted that the commissioners of both inquiries took great pains to emphasise that none of these 
men had ever been charged by Canadian authorities and many view the inquiries as having 
effectively cleared the names of these men.
2 
                                                      
2 See Kerry Pither, “The Shameful Truth”, Ottawa Citizen, 23 October 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/opinion/story.html?id=5d22c6c4-a088-4f71-bf48-
6c4975eef481&p=2); see also “Canada failed three citizens”, editorial, Toronto Star, 22 October 2008 
(retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/521536); and Council on American–Islamic 
Relations Canada (CAIR–CAN), “Intervenors Call for Follow-Up Action on Iacobucci’s Report”, Press  INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD | 3 
 
Commissioner Frank Iacobucci explained that, prior to 9/11, CSIS had learned about the 
possibility that Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin “might have some knowledge of the 
threat to Canada and Canadian interests abroad”.
3 After 9/11, these three men, as well as Mr 
Arar, became part of two RCMP investigations, ‘Project O’ and ‘Project A-O’.
4 In the context of 
both Project O and Project A-O, the RCMP shared information – including information that was 
later determined to be unfounded, unfair, misleading and inaccurate
5 – about these four men with 
other Canadian agencies and with American officials. 
2.3 Detention  chronology 
Mr Elmaati arrived in Damascus on 12 November 2001 and was taken into custody. He was 
detained in the Palestinian branch of Syrian military intelligence until January 2002, when he 
was transferred to a prison in Egypt. Mr Almalki travelled to Syria and was detained in the 
Palestinian branch on 3 May 2002. Later that year, Mr Arar was detained in New York on 23 
September 2002 and sent to Syria on 9 October 2002. Almost a year later, on 3 October 2003, 
Mr Arar was released from Syrian custody and travelled back to Canada. In December 2003, Mr 
Nureddin was detained in Syria. Shortly afterwards, on 11 January 2004, Mr Elmaati was 
released by Egyptian officials after more than two years in detention. Two days later, Mr 
Nureddin was released by Syrian officials after just over two months in jail. Finally, Mr Almalki 
was released in Syria on 10 March 2004 after almost two years in custody. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Release, CAIR–CAN, Ottawa, 24 October 2008 (retrieved from http://www.caircan.ca/print_itn_more. 
php?id=3006_0_2_0_C); and Irwin Cotler, “The Arar inquiry, what should happen now?”, National Post, 
3 October 2006 (retrieved from http://www.irwincotler.parl.gc.ca/detail.asp?lang=e&type=med&sid 
=1912).  
3 Internal Inquiry into the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-
Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, “Internal Inquiry into the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin”, Ottawa, 21 October 2008, p. 109, 
para. 2, p. 195, para. 2 and p. 253 para. 2 (retrieved from www.iacobucciinquiry.ca) (henceforth 
‘Iacobucci’, 2008). 
4 After being detained and questioned at the US–Canada border as a result of a TECS lookout (TECS 
refers to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System that is used by US Customs as well as other 
agencies), Mr Elmaati became known to the RCMP and CSIS and was later a focus of the Project O 
investigation that had started in late September 2001 (ibid., p. 112, para. 13). Mr Almalki was a focus of 
the RCMP’s Project A-O investigation (Project A-O focused on Mr Almalki’s “alleged involvement with 
al-Qaeda”, ibid., p. 19, para. 10) and Mr Arar became part of this investigation after he met with Mr 
Almalki at a restaurant (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background, Vol. 1, Ottawa: Government of 
Canada Publications, 18 September 2006(a) (retrieved from http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-
bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm) (henceforth ‘O’Connor 
Factual Report’, 2006a). Mr Nureddin was suspected by the CSIS of acting as a financial courier for 
individuals believed to be supporting Islamic extremism and was of interest to the RCMP through the 
Project O investigation (see Iacobucci, 2008, p. 253, para. 3).  
5 See for example the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations, Ottawa: Government 
of Canada Publications, 18 September 2006(b), pp. 101, 104 and 113 (retrieved from http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm) 
(henceforth ‘O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations’, 2006b); see also Iacobucci (2008), pp. 349, 369, 
375 and 400.  4 | LINDSAY AAGAARD 
 
2.4 Treatment 
Both commissioners determined that the men at the centre of their inquiries had been subject to 
torture, as defined by the accepted international definition of this abhorrent practice in the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Commissioner O’Connor accepted the findings of Stephen Toope, who had been asked to report 
on Mr Arar’s treatment while detained abroad, and who had found that Mr Arar had indeed been 
tortured.
6 Mr Arar had been beaten over a period of two weeks, threatened with other forms of 
torture and kept in a small, dark and dirty cell, which “became a torture in its own right”.
7  
Commissioner Iacobucci concluded that Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin had all 
endured treatment that amounted to torture, which aligned with Mr Toope’s finding in the 
context of the O’Connor inquiry that the stories of these three men were credible.
8 First, in 
Syrian detention, Mr Elmaati was insulted, punched, kicked and beaten with a black cable. He 
was held in a very small, dirty basement cell, with no heating in the middle of winter. Mr 
Elmaati was transferred to a prison in Egypt, where he was interrogated roughly, beaten and 
suffered what he considered the worst conditions of his entire ordeal at his second place of 
Egyptian detention, in Nasr City, where he was continuously handcuffed in a dark, dirty cell 
infested with rats and cockroaches. Second, Mr Almalki was insulted, physically abused, 
threatened and beaten with a black cable on the soles of his feet. He, like Mr Nureddin, was then 
made to stand up while cold water was poured on his feet and he was forced to run on the spot 
before the procedure was then repeated. He was held in a small, dirty, dark cell infested with 
insects and rats. He had two mouldy blankets, and the cell was freezing in winter and stifling hot 
in the summer months. Finally, Mr Nureddin was stripped, repeatedly beaten on his feet with 
black cable and endured other forms of physical and psychological abuse.  
2.5 Inquiries 
The O’Connor inquiry was established by Prime Minister Paul Martin by an Order-in-Council 
on 5 February 2004.
9 It was set up as a public commission of inquiry and the Honourable Dennis 
O’Connor, Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, was named commissioner. A factual report was 
released in September 2006 and a second report containing specific policy recommendations was 
released in December 2006. 
The Iacobucci inquiry was an internal inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials from three 
institutions (the RCMP, CSIS and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or 
DFAIT) in relation to Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin.
10 An Order-in-Council on 11 
                                                      
6 See the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar, Report of 
Professor Stephen J. Toope, Fact Finder, Ottawa, Government of Canada Publications, 14 October 2005, 
pp. 17 and 23 (retrieved from http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-
09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm) (henceforth ‘Toope report’, 2005); see also the O’Connor 
Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 9. 
7 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 56. 
8 Toope report (2005), p. 13. 
9 Privy Council Office, Order appointing the Honourable Dennis R. O’Connor to investigate and report on 
the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher Arar, PC Number 2004-0048, Ottawa, 5 February 
2004 (retrieved from http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/OIC-DDC.asp?lang=eng&Page=secretariats&txtOICID 
=2004-0048&txtFromDate=&txtToDate=&txtPrecis=&txtDepartment=&txtAct=&txtChapterNo=&txt 
ChapterYear=&txtBillNo=&rdoComingIntoForce=&DoSearch=Search+%2F+List&OICKey=61483) 
(henceforth ‘O’Connor Order-in-Council’, 2004). 
10 Iacobucci (2008), p. 34, para. 6. INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD | 5 
 
December 2006 established the inquiry’s terms of reference, and recently retired Supreme Court 
of Canada judge the Honourable Frank Iacobucci was named commissioner.
11 Unlike the 
O’Connor inquiry, however, the Iacobucci inquiry was an internal rather than public 
investigation. This was a decision made by the Conservative government under Mr Harper, and 
appears based on the recommendation made by Commissioner O’Connor that the cases of these 
three men be reviewed through an “independent and credible” but private process. 
Commissioner O’Connor had cautioned against setting up another full-scale public inquiry, 
given the “tortuous, time-consuming and expensive” ordeal that public inquiries can become 
when there are issues of national security to be considered and protected.
12 The Iacobucci report 
was released on 21 October 2008. 
3. Context 
3.1  Background on the Canadian agencies involved 
There are many players in the Canadian national security and intelligence network, but three 
agencies were most central to the O’Connor and Iacobucci reports.
13 First, the RCMP is 
Canada’s national police service, and it has grown from an institution with 150 officers in 1873 
to its present size of over 28,000 employees. The RCMP maintains responsibility for policing at 
the national, provincial and municipal levels. The RCMP is responsible for national security law 
enforcement. During the period throughout which Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr 
Nureddin were detained abroad, the RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate was in charge of 
matters falling under the RCMP’s national security mandate.
14 The RCMP has been the focus of 
most of the recommendations in the O’Connor inquiry. 
Second, CSIS is the Canadian civilian intelligence agency. CSIS investigates threats, analyses 
information, produces intelligence and “reports to and advises the government of Canada”. CSIS 
characterises itself as a “proactive” organisation, in contrast with the “reactive” role played by 
law enforcement entities such as the RCMP.
15 Third, the DFAIT is the federal government 
department charged with Canada’s ‘external affairs’. Among other responsibilities, DFAIT 
provides consular services to Canadians detained abroad.
16  
                                                      
11 Privy Council Office, Order appointing and directing The Hon. Frank Iacobucci to conduct an inquiry to 
be known as the Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, 




‘Iacobucci Order-in-Council’, 2006). 
12 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), pp. 277–78. 
13 For instance, the Communications Security Establishment is responsible for the monitoring and 
collection of foreign signals intelligence. 
14 See for example, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “About the RCMP”, RCMP, Ottawa, 15 July 2008 
(retrieved from http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about/index_e.htm); see also Iacobucci (2008), p. 34, para. 8 
and p. 73, para. 36. 
15 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “About CSIS”, CSIS, Ottawa, 25 April 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/bts/index-eng.asp); see also Iacobucci (2008), p. 34, para. 7. 
16 See Iacobucci (2008), p. 34, para. 9; see also Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (FAITC), 
“About the Department”, FAITC, Ottawa, 6 November 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/index.aspx?menu_id=17&menu=L).  6 | LINDSAY AAGAARD 
 
3.2  The post-9/11 environment 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 marked 
the largest terrorist event on American soil. In the days that followed, in addition to mourning 
the 24 Canadians who died in the attacks, Canada joined many other nations in launching a new 
era of national, continental and global security policy.  
After the events of 9/11, Canada saw “a greater emphasis on matters of national security and 
public safety within government”.
17 An Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security and 
Anti-Terrorism was established by Prime Minister Jean Chretien to review all policies and 
legislation and facilitate adjustment to the “new realities” of a post-9/11 security landscape.
18 
Canada’s legislative response to terrorism was overhauled.
19 There were also “unprecedented” 
demands placed on Canadian officials and the workloads of those in the national security and 
intelligence fields.
20 Consequently, the responsibilities of Canadian agencies underwent some 
change. Certain CSIS resources were soon exhausted by investigative demands, which 
necessitated increased assistance from law enforcement agencies. In an extensive transfer of 
investigatory responsibility, the primary responsibility for several national security 
investigations was moved from CSIS to the RCMP – including responsibility for the 
investigations in which Mr Arar and Mr Almalki were implicated.
21  
Furthermore, although “a ‘go it alone’ approach to counterterrorism was never an option for 
Canada”,
22 information sharing and cooperation with domestic and international agencies took 
on new importance and precedence after 9/11.
23 There was American-led pressure on CSIS and 
the RCMP for “maximum” cooperation, collaboration and information sharing.
24 Commissioner 
O’Connor quoted Jack Hooper, former assistant director of operations for CSIS, who testified 
that “[c]ompromising al-Qaeda operations requires an unprecedented level…of cooperation 
between police, law enforcement, immigration officials and the like, not just domestically, but 
internationally as well”.
25  
One of the key elements of the government’s Anti-Terrorism Plan immediately after the attacks 
was to work with the international community, and among the initiatives advanced by a $280 
million infusion were technology and equipment upgrades to facilitate coordinated domestic and 
international law enforcement responses.
26 For the RCMP in particular, 9/11 led to a “shaper 
                                                      
17 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar, A New Review 
Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities, Ottawa, Government of Canada Publications, 12 
December 2006, p. 23 (retrieved from http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/ 
maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm) (henceforth ‘O’Connor Policy Report’, 
2006c). 
18 Iacobucci (2008), p. 94, para. 117. 
19 See the comprehensive legislative overview in the O’Connor Policy Report (2006c), p. 55. 
20 Iacobucci (2008), p. 34, para. 10. 
21 Ibid., p. 94 paras. 118 and 122, p. 95, para. 124. 
22 David A. Charters, “(Un)peaceable Kingdom?”, IRPP Policy Matters, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2008, p. 37. 
23 See for example the O’Connor Policy Report (2006c), p. 73.  
24 Iacobucci (2008), p. 93, paras. 115–117. 
25 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 102. 
26 Iacobucci (2008), p. 94 para. 117; the document referenced by Iacobucci is Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada (FAITC), “Backgrounder, Canada’s Actions against Terrorism since 
September 11, 2001”, FAITC, Ottawa, 7 February 2003 (retrieved from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-
terrorism/Canadaactions-en.asp). In addition, the Smart Border Declaration and accompanying Action 
Plan were agreed by the US and Canada in December 2001, and involved details on the extensive sharing INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD | 7 
 
focus” on cooperation, integration and information sharing among domestic agencies and with 
foreign agencies.
27 
While Canada was struggling with how to protect itself and contribute to the protection of its 
allies, so were many European countries. The renewed emphasis on cooperation is far from 
exclusive to Canada and it remains a dominant feature of the entire international effort to counter 
terrorism. For instance, UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted after 9/11, specifically 
calls for international cooperation.
28 The invocation of Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by 
NATO was a display of solidarity and cooperation, as was the agreement among NATO 
members to take measures “individually and collectively, to expand the options available in the 
campaign against terrorism”.
29 The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in December 2005 
states that one of the ways in which the EU can add value to the counter-terrorism efforts is by 
“working with others beyond the EU, particularly the UN, other international organisations and 
key third countries, to deepen the international consensus, build capacity and strengthen 
cooperation to counter terrorism”.
30 As Susie Alegre writes, the fight against terrorism has been 
a “main driver” behind the external cooperation seen in the EU on justice and home affairs 
issues.
31  
3.3  Cooperation at the expense of human rights 
The years since 9/11 have been marked by inter-state and inter-agency cooperation, but also by 
concerns that this cooperation has been carried out at the expense of the security and rights of 
individuals. Canada and several European nations share certain unacceptable defects in their 
fight against terrorism, where the treatment of their citizens – and others – appears to run counter 
to domestic responsibilities and international human rights obligations.
32 It is in this post-9/11 
landscape that the men at the centre of the two Canadian inquiries became wrapped up in 
national security investigations and in this environment that they were detained and tortured in 
foreign countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
of information that would occur between the two countries. This includes the sharing of advance 
passenger information and passenger name records (O’Connor Policy Report, 2006c, p. 76). 
27 O’Connor Policy Report (2006c), p. 73. 
28 UN Security Council, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism 
Resolutions: Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation”, Press Release, 
SC/7158, UN Security Council, New York (retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
2001/sc7158.doc.htm). 
29 For further discussion on Art. V and these measures, see Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
(PACE), Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: 
Second report, Explanatory Memorandum, PACE Doc. 11302 Rev., Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights, Rapporteur: Dick Marty, Strasbourg, 11 June 2007, pp. 18–20 (henceforth ‘Marty’, 2007). 
30 Council of the European Union, European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05, REV 4, 
Brussels, 30 November 2005, p. 4 (retrieved from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/ 
st14469-re04.en05.pdf).  
31 Susie Alegre, The EU’s External Cooperation in Criminal Justice and Counter-terrorism: An 
assessment of the human rights implications with a particular focus on cooperation with Canada, CEPS 
Special Report, CEPS, Brussels, September 2008 (retrieved from http://www.ceps.be/Article.php? 
article_id=16).  
32 Amnesty International, “Casesheets: Amnesty International is highlighting the following cases for 
membership action”, Amnesty International, London, June 2008(a).  8 | LINDSAY AAGAARD 
 
Both Canada and European nations have been criticised heavily for too often letting what should 
be strict adherence to the rule of law and the principles of fundamental human rights fall aside in 
the fight against terrorism. As Judith Tóth writes, the excesses of this fight have “produced a 
serious and ‘dangerous erosion of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ – which Kofi Annan 
expressed as a major concern”.
33 There are grave apprehensions that cooperation among nations 
and agencies has occurred without regard for what Irwin Cotler has referred to as the “dual 
human rights dimension” of the human security principle.
34 That is, just as terrorism must be 
fought in order to protect our individual and collective rights,
35 so too must “the enactment, 
enforcement and application of anti-terrorism law…always comport with the rule of law”.
36 
Likewise, Amnesty International Canada has called any debate about a choice between security 
or human rights a “false” debate, for “human rights will always be precarious if security is not 
assured, and security will inevitably be tenuous at best if not firmly grounded in human rights”.
37  
Cooperation in investigations can take many forms, but that which has raised the most concerns 
in the inquiries has been the sharing of information. Commissioners O’Connor and Iacobucci 
both emphasised that international cooperation in the fight against terrorism is essential and is 
not in itself a practice to be condemned. Too often, however, this cooperation has occurred in a 
deeply flawed manner.
38 The inquiries pointed to numerous instances of cooperation between 
foreign and domestic agencies that contributed to the detention and torture of these four men.  
This state of affairs appears to illustrate what Reg Whitaker has referred as “the Canadian 
dilemma in antiterrorist cooperation”: the fight against terrorism requires close cooperation 
among allies, but “the unilateralist approach of the Bush administration – not to speak of   
 
                                                      
33 See Judith Tóth, “EU Member States’ Complicity in Extraordinary Renditions”, in Elspeth Guild and 
Florian Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice?, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008, pp. 71–90 and 
75; see also William P. Pope, “Remarks to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee 
on Europe and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights”, Washington, D.C., 14 
September 2004 (retrieved from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/36239.htm).  
34“Simply put, in the course of promoting and protecting human security we cannot undermine our 
individual and collective human rights, which are constituent elements of that human security itself” 
(Irwin Cotler, “From Professor to Justice Minister: Charter Rights and Anti-Terrorism”, Policy Options, 
November 2007, p. 72, retrieved from http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/nov07/cotler.pdf). 
35 “The challenge for democracies in the battle against terrorism is not whether to respond, but rather how 
to do so” according to Iacobucci and Arbour in Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 at para. 5; see also the opening statement of Commissioner Iacobucci’s report: “at its 
core, [the] Inquiry involves the appropriate response of our democracy in Canada to the pernicious 
phenomenon of terrorism, and ensuring that, in protecting the security of our country, we respect the 
human rights and freedoms that so many have fought to achieve” (Iacobucci, 2008). 
36 Cotler (2007). 
37 Amnesty International, Restoring his Rights, Addressing the Wrongs: Amnesty International’s Closing 
Submissions to the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, Amnesty International, London, 10 September 2005, pp. 4–5 (retrieved from 
http://www.amnesty.ca/human_rights_issues/maher_arar_overview.php). “In my view the protection of 
fundamental human rights is every bit as important as the preservation of national security cited by 
President Bush; indeed I hold these two objectives to be complementary, mutually reinforcing and in no 
way contradictory” (Marty, 2007, p. 10). 
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Congress under either Republican or Democratic majorities – and its stated philosophy of 
‘fighting fire with fire’, entails the risk that cooperation might undermine Canadian sovereignty 
and the rights of Canadian citizens”.
39  
Moreover, the Canadian dilemma is also a European dilemma. There are numerous examples 
among European countries where amidst the desire for cooperation in an effective fight against 
global terrorism, international human rights obligations have not been respected.
40 We know that 
Europe has been home to secret CIA prisons in Poland and Romania.
41 European nations 
permitted their territory to form part of CIA “rendition circuits”,
42 and have “taken advantage” of 
extraordinary renditions and unlawful detentions by sending security personnel to interrogate 
unlawfully detained individuals and by receiving information gleaned from these detainees.
43 As 
Dick Marty, rapporteur with the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), wrote in 
2006, the approach taken by the American government with respect to detention is “utterly alien 
to the European tradition and sensibility”.
44  
Within the post-9/11 context, with the attendant emphasis on information sharing and 
cooperation, states must work to ensure that in this fight, the freedoms of their citizens are 
respected and obligations met. And it becomes necessary, when that dual human rights 
dimension has not been respected, for states to find a way to respond appropriately: the truth 
must be made public, there must be accountability for mistakes made and there must be 
reparation made to those who have suffered. The Canadian inquiries at the centre of this paper 
reflect one way in which a state may react to charges that it has been complicit in the 
mistreatment of its citizens and that it has failed to adequately protect them.  
4.  The cost of contribution 
Before turning to the findings of the inquiries and the commission of inquiry model itself, this 
section of the paper seeks to explore some of the costs incurred as a result of Canada’s 
contribution to the ordeals suffered by Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin. 
Three categories of costs are outlined below: monetary costs, reputational costs and political 
costs. 
It should be said at the outset that these costs are secondary to the price that Mr Arar, Mr 
Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin have already paid for the mistakes of Canadian officials. 
These four men endured multiple forms of torture, humiliation and terror in Syrian – and in the 
case of Mr Elmaati, Egyptian – custody. They still suffer the psychological and physical effects 
                                                      
39 Reg Whitaker, “Arar: The Affair, the Inquiry, the Aftermath”, IRPP Policy Matters, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008, 
p. 26. 
40 See section 6 of this paper on investigations.  
41 Tóth (2008), p. 71; see also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), Alleged secret 
detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states, 
Report, PACE Doc. 10957, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Rapporteur: Dick Marty, 
Strasbourg, 12 June 2006, p. 4 (henceforth ‘Marty’, 2006). 
42 Marty (2007), para. 41. 
43 Florian Geyer, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Member States’ Indirect Use of Extraordinary Rendition 
and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, CEPS Working Document No. 263, CEPS, Brussels, April 2007, 
pp. 2–4 (retrieved from http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=16). 
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of this treatment and they are all still fighting what is surely a disheartening battle to hold all 
those responsible for their mistreatment to account.
45 
Nevertheless, as Commissioner Iacobucci writes in the commissioner’s statement that opens the 
Iacobucci report, mistakes made in the course of the fight against terrorism can have “serious 
consequences not only for individuals affected but also for our institutions and our collective 
faith in our institutions”. This statement draws our attention to just one of the multiple costs of 
Canadian complicity and more generally to the far-reaching consequences of the government 
mistakes exposed by both inquiries.  
4.1 Monetary  cost 
The most easily quantifiable cost of the actions of Canadian officials is the monetary cost. First, 
these actions have necessitated two costly public inquiries. In addition to the individual budget 
of each inquiry, there are also associated costs throughout the government for items such as 
government counsel. For the O’Connor inquiry, this pushed the final cost to over $20 million. 
Although the final figures for the Iacobucci inquiry (in particular those from 31 March 2008 to 
the present) have not been determined, to date the inquiry has cost a minimum of $6 million.
46 
This is a very conservative figure, which does not include the cost incurred to the government 
for government lawyers and other departmental expenses. 
Another significant monetary cost is the payment of compensation to the individuals wrongfully 
detained and mistreated. This could arise in the context of civil litigation or through ‘voluntary’ 
payments by the government to individuals. For instance, Mr Arar was paid $10.5 million by the 
Harper government in January 2007, and we have yet to see if payment will be made to Mr 
Almalki, Mr Elmaati or Mr Nureddin. 
4.2 Reputational  cost 
4.2.1 Individual  reputation 
Although inquiries are not used to make determinations of civil or criminal culpability, it is 
undoubted that they have the possibility to severely tarnish the reputations of the individuals 
involved.
47 Indeed, although neither inquiry had the mandate to investigate the actions of 
                                                      
45 Toope report (2005), pp. 19–22. 
46 See “Arar Inquiry cost $23M and growing, gov’t says”, CTV.ca 26 February 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20050226/arar_inquirycosts_20050225?s_name=
&no_ads). The total expenditure of the Iacobucci inquiry for the fiscal year of 31 March 2007–31 March 
2008 was $5,108,642 (Receiver General for Canada, 2008 Public Accounts of Canada, Volume III, 
Additional Information and Analysis, Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, 2008(b), p. 267 
(retrieved from http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/recgen/txt/72-eng.html). The Iacobucci inquiry also spent 
$455,000 on funding for interveners and participants during this period, and it is unclear if this amount 
was included in the “total expenditure” figure noted above (Receiver General for Canada, 2008 Public 
Accounts of Canada, Volume II, Details of Expenses and Revenues, Ottawa: Government of Canada 
Publications, 2008(a), p. 431 (retrieved from http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/recgen/txt/72-eng.html). The 
total expenditure of the Iacobucci Inquiry for the fiscal year of 31 March 2006–31 March 2007 was 
$900,000 (Receiver General for Canada, 2007 Public Accounts of Canada, Volume III, Additional 
Information and Analysis, Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, 2007, p. 266 (retrieved from 
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/public_accounts_can/2007/P51-1-2007-3E.pdf)).  
47 See for instance, Beno v. Canada (Commissioner and Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into the 
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia), [1997] 2 F.C. 527, para. 23. Quoted with approval in INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD | 11 
 
specific persons, the O’Connor and Iacobucci inquiries delivered reports with a level of detail 
sufficient to negatively affect the reputations of several individuals.
48 For example, Mr Arar’s 
lawyer in New York prior to his detention, Amal Oummih, made a mistake concerning a phone 
message and as a result was not present at her client’s deportation hearing.
49 Léo Martel, the 
Canadian consul in Syria, discussed in a memorandum after Mr Arar’s release concerns that Mr 
Arar would “go public” with allegations of torture, while erroneously stating that Mr Arar had 
not told him he had been mistreated.
50 Staff Sergeant Callaghan with the RCMP admitted to 
thinking the suggestion that they ask the Syrians not to torture Mr Almalki when sending them 
questions was “off the wall absurd”.
51  
Perhaps the individual who received the most scorn for his actions was Franco Pillarella, 
Canada’s ambassador to Syria from 27 July 2000 to 31 July 2003. During his tenure in 
Damascus, Mr Arar, Mr Almalki and Mr Elmaati were detained and tortured in Syria. At the 
O’Connor inquiry, he defended both his reluctance to conclude that torture was a risk for Mr 
Arar as well as his assertion that he was not aware of human rights violations in Syria at the 
time. In the view of Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s former ambassador to the UN, Mr Pillarella’s 
assertions put the Department of Foreign Affairs and the entire Canadian Foreign Service in a 
bad light.
52 Mr Pillarella became ambassador to Romania after leaving Syria, a post that he no 
longer retains. It does not appear that Mr Pillarella has received another diplomatic posting.  
Former RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli is another individual whose personal 
reputation has been sullied by what was revealed in the inquiries. Mr Zaccardelli, who was the 
RCMP’s top ranking official throughout the period during which Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin were detained overseas, resigned from his position as commissioner in 
early December 2006. He resigned after giving conflicting testimony before the federal Public 
Safety Parliamentary Committee: he testified first that he had been informed of the fact that the 
RCMP had provided incorrect information about Mr Arar to the Americans as early as 2002 and 
that attempts had been made to correct that information. Later, however, he testified that he had 
not learned of this RCMP mistake until the release of Commissioner O’Connor’s first report in 
September 2006.
53  
After Mr Zaccardelli’s resignation, Lorne Waldman (Mr Arar’s lawyer at the time) remarked, 
“accountability starts at the top”, and as one member of Parliament succinctly put it, “it’s a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 440, 
para. 34.  
48 Iacobucci (2008), p. 42, para. 7, p. 336 para. 13, p. 340 para. 29.  
49 O’Connor Factual Report (2006a), pp. 199–200. 
50 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 253. 
51 Iacobucci (2008), p. 224 para. 128. 
52 See “Sharp Rebuke for Ambassador over Arar Comments”, CBCnews.ca, 17 June 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2005/06/16/arar050616.html). 
53 See Parliament of Canada, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Evidence, 39
th 
Parliament, 1
st Session, Ottawa, 5 December 2006 (retrieved from http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ 
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2565738&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1); see also 
Audrey Macklin, “From Cooperation, to Complicity, to Compensation: The War on Terror, Extraordinary 
Rendition, and the Cost of Torture”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 17; 
and “RCMP’s embattled chief quits over Arar testimony”, CBCnews.ca, 6 December 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/12/06/zaccardelli.html). 12 | LINDSAY AAGAARD 
 
start”.
54 Mr Waldman also added that accountability at the top levels should not be where 
accountability stops.
55 Nevertheless, a loss of reputation is perhaps all that has been suffered by 
those who had a role in the mistakes made throughout the RCMP, CSIS and DFAIT: there have 
been no disciplinary or other measures taken against Canadian officials, and in fact some of 
those involved have been promoted.
56  
Inquiries can also have an effect on the reputations of the victims of the government action under 
investigation. Sometimes this effect can be positive, although in other instances it is less clear. 
For instance, the O’Connor inquiry has helped to “clear” Mr Arar’s name, as Mr Arar had hoped 
it would.
57 Commissioner O’Connor was able to state “categorically” that there was no evidence 
of Mr Arar’s guilt whatsoever.
58 As Commissioner O’Connor wrote, “[t]he disturbing part of all 
this is that it took a public inquiry to set the record straight”.
59 The O’Connor inquiry also 
revealed the reputation-damaging government leaks concerning Mr Arar and his wife as being 
unfair, false and malicious. Moreover, soon after the release of the reports, Mr Arar received an 
apology and compensation from the federal government.  
Still, this type of exoneration is not always possible in the context of a commission of inquiry 
that is not explicitly designed to examine the actions of the victims, and we have the Iacobucci 
inquiry to illustrate this side of the coin. Commissioner Iacobucci noted that the inquiry over 
which he presided was not a commission of inquiry into the actions of the three men involved. 
He did emphasise that these men were not charged with anything, that his repetition of the 
allegations made against these men should not be taken as a substantiation of those allegations 
and that they are presumed innocent of any wrongdoing in accordance with the principles of law 
and fundamental fairness. Even so, this no doubt fell short of what these men would have hoped 
for in their efforts to clear their names.
60  
 
                                                      
54 See “RCMP’s Zaccardelli resigns over Arar testimony”, CTV.ca, 6 December 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061205/arar_zaccardelli_061206?s_name=&no
_ads). 
55 Scott Deveau, “Zaccardelli resigns as RCMP chief”, globeandmail.com, 6 December 2006 (retrieved 
from  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061206.wrcmp1206/BNStory/Front/ 
home). 
56 Alex Neve, Khaled Mouammar, Sameer Zuberi, Faisal Kutty, Nehal Bhuta and Warren Allmand, “Time 
for justice on rights abuses”, Toronto Star, 18 November 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/538854) (henceforth Neve et al., 2008, ‘joint letter’). Moreover, 
Whitaker adds that “[e]very officer who could have been the source of the leaks [about Mr Arar and his 
family] has subsequently been promoted or otherwise rewarded for his service” (Whitaker, 2008, p. 24). 
57 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 59. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., p. 62. 
60 See Iacobucci (2008), p. 43, para. 10, p. 44, para. 13 and p. 44, para. 12. In their final joint submission 
to the Iacobucci inquiry, the counsel for the three men and several interveners reiterated that there was 
nothing the men would like more than to clear their names, but the process adopted by the inquiry did not 
allow them to effectively do so (Internal Inquiry into the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, Submissions of the Applicants, Ahmad 
Abou-Elmaati, Muayyed Nureddin, Abdullah Almalki, Canadian Council for American Islamic Relations, 
Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association and Canadian Arab Federation, Ottawa, 16 October 2007, 
para. 8 (retrieved from www.iacobucciinquiry.ca) (henceforth ‘October Submission of the Applicants’, 
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4.2.2  Institutional reputation  
The actions of the RCMP, CSIS and DFAIT officials in relation to Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin give great cause for concern, and hence they cannot but diminish the 
reputation of these institutions in the eyes of Canadians.
61 These inquiries told the stories of 
these four men and laid out for the public in great detail how Canadian officials contributed to 
their abuse abroad.
62 The findings of the inquiries revealed unacceptable practices within these 
Canadian agencies, and Commissioner O’Connor’s recommendations relating to these 
institutions were buttressed by a wealth of detailed evidence. Many Canadians would have been 
surprised to learn that existing policies surrounding caveats and the transmission of information 
were not followed by the RCMP, and they were no doubt shocked to learn about the lack of 
training given to members of the Foreign Service working in countries with suspect human 
rights records. These are the easy, ‘take-away’ elements from the inquiries that can leave a 
lasting and damning mark on the reputations of the Canadian agencies in the minds of 
Canadians. As such, although inquiries play a crucial role in the restoration of public faith in the 
government and its institutions,
63 and although inquiries can point the way forward by providing 
concrete steps towards improving the status quo, they also have the effect of highlighting the 
current deficiencies.  
The government’s own concerns about the conduct of these agencies were made plain by the 
establishment of the inquiries in the first place. For instance, the mandate of the O’Connor 
inquiry was not only to look into the conduct of Canadian officials with respect to Mr Arar, but 
also to make policy recommendations about an independent review mechanism for the RCMP’s 
national security activities.
64 Thus from the outset of the O’Connor inquiry, it was clear that 
there were recognised problems within the RCMP that needed to be addressed.  
It appears that the reputation of the RCMP in particular has been affected. The many revelations 
contained in Commissioner O’Connor’s two reports mark the starting point of what has become 
a deeper investigation into several aspects of Canada’s main law enforcement agency. In March 
2007, the Harper government launched an independent investigation into allegations of suspect 
hiring practices, pension fraud and an internal cover-up within the RCMP.
65 Leading up to this 
investigation, one of the RCMP officers testifying before a parliamentary committee looking 
into the matter stated that: “every core value and rule of ethical conduct that I held to be true and 
dear as a rank-and-file member of the RCMP has been decimated and defiled by employees at 
the highest levels of the RCMP”. In response to the concerns raised by the independent 
                                                      
61 In remarking that the first objective of a new RCMP review mechanism should be to ensure that 
national security activities comply with Canadian law and values, O’Connor noted that this objective is 
essential to engender public trust and confidence (O’Connor Policy Report, 2006c, p. 464).  
62 Although the Iacobucci inquiry was conducted away from the public eye to an overwhelming degree, a 
public version of the report was issued. Even assuming facts are omitted from the public version that 
would affect Canadians’ confidence in their institutions, what was in the public report was certainly 
enough to do so. 
63 This point in particular is discussed further in the final section of this paper, where the benefits of the 
commission of inquiry model are discussed. 
64 This policy review process involved the examination of “the entire field of security policy and practice” 
(Whitaker, 2008, p. 28). 
65 See Public Safety Canada, “RCMP Pension and Insurance Plan Investigation”, Public Safety Canada, 
Ottawa, 13 March 2008(a) (retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/rcmppension-retraitegrc/iircmp-
grc-en.asp#bk); see also Kady O’Malley and Chris Selley, “RCMP Scandal Deepens”, Macleans.ca, 29 
March 2007 (retrieved from http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20070329_ 
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investigation, the government then set up a task force to examine the need for changes in the 
governance and culture of the RCMP, with a report released at the end of 2007.
66 The 
recommendations in this report have yet to be taken up by the government, but could be 
something that the recently re-elected Harper administration will be forced to address. 
The RCMP was not the only agency towards which recommendations were directed: the 
O’Connor inquiry also highlighted problems with the status quo pertaining to interagency 
communication, accountability and the general policies of CSIS and DFAIT. David Charters has 
recently written that the history of the Canadian response to terrorist incidents prior to 9/11 
“does not give much cause for confidence” in the ability of the Canadian players to integrate as 
necessary. As he writes, “[a] host of incidents, from the October Crisis to the bus hijacking, 
highlighted gaps, lack of preparedness and poor cooperation among levels of government and 
policing and security agencies that need to work together”.
67 Ultimately, and at the very least, the 
inquiries have left Canadians with the impression that the institutions leading the fight against 
terrorism were uncoordinated and ill equipped, and unable to carry out their responsibilities 
without serious mistakes.  
4.2.3 National  reputation   
The O’Connor and Iacobucci inquiries have served to add Canada’s mistreatment of its own 
citizens in the post-9/11 environment to the list of issues that temper Canada’s esteem and 
reputation, both internationally and at home. Canada does have a generally positive reputation 
for the protection of human rights, equality and tolerance, and deservedly so.
68 Yet, this 
reputation is far from unshakable: it has been weakened by the numerous instances where 
Canada has not applied the principles of basic human rights in its policies and actions in the 
past,
69 as well as by recent events for which Canada has been taken to task at the international 
level.
70 And now, the actions of Canadian officials in the cases of Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr 
                                                      
66 Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP, Rebuilding the Trust, Ottawa: 
Government of Canada Publications, December 2007 (retrieved from www.publicsafety.gc.ca/rcmp-
grc/_fl/Task_Force_Report-English.pdf). 
67 Charters (2008), p. 38. 
68 See for example, Parliament of Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights, “Promises to 
Keep: Implementing Canada’s Human Rights Obligations”, Ottawa, December 2001 (retrieved from 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/huma-e/rep-e/rep02dec01-e.htm); for general 
information and reports, see the “Canada” homepage on the website of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva (retrieved from www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/ENACARegion/ 
Pages/CAIndex.aspx). 
69 As Kent Roach writes, “it is healthy for Canadians to debate recent anti-terrorism measures with an 
acute awareness of our failures in the past” (Kent Roach, “Did September 11 Change Everything? 
Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the Face of Terrorism” (2002) 47 McGill LJ 894–947 at 940–
41). For example, since the beginning of the 20
th century, Canada has imposed head taxes on immigrants 
of certain ethnicities, turned away Jews fleeing the Holocaust in Europe, allowed the forced sterilisation of 
disabled women, and run a residential school system for aboriginal children as part of a policy of 
assimilation that was rife with abuse. 
70 See Alegre (2008), p. 12; see also Amnesty International (Canada), Canada and the International 
Protection of Human Rights, Amnesty International, Ottawa, December 2007(b) (retrieved from 
http://www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/Human_Rights_Agenda_2007.pdf). As Alex Neve of 
Amnesty International (Canada) has said, some of the Canadian government’s recent positions on human 
rights issues are undermining its past leadership role in this area. Canada was taken to task in a December 
2007 Amnesty International report for issues such as the government’s opposition to a declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, the failure of the government to oppose the death penalty in all cases and for 
all Canadian citizens, and for generally wavering in “strengthening the UN human rights system” INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD | 15 
 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin will be forever attached to Canada’s track record on human rights, 
further attenuating Canada’s reputation as a leader in the advancement of a global human rights 
agenda.  
Compensation and reparations have not been made to Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati or Mr Nureddin, 
and the Canadian public currently has little evidence of any progress on the implementation the 
O’Connor inquiry’s extensive recommendations.
71 Without the full and transparent 
implementation of these recommendations, can there be any meaningful promise that other 
Canadians will not be mistreated and detained abroad as a result of the institutional weaknesses 
revealed by the inquiries? As was stated by the Globe and Mail editorial after the release of the 
Iacobucci report, it would not be surprising to those already familiar with Mr Arar’s story that 
“Canada was willing to sell out its citizens of Arab descent who fell under suspicion during the 
tense months after Sept. 11, 2001”.
72 At present, there seems little assurance available to the 
public that Canada could not “sell out” its citizens again.  
It remains that at a minimum, even if prompt action is taken immediately to implement all the 
required recommendations and overhauls highlighted by the inquiry process, even if all 
reparations are made and even if no other Canadian suffers the fate that Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, 
Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin did, these inquiries reveal that Canada has joined the legion of 
other countries that have engaged in dubious practices at the expense of the rights of their 
citizens in the post-9/11 environment.
73  
4.3 Political  cost 
The inquiries have forced both the Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of 
Canada – the two most widely and consistently supported parties in the country – to pay a 
political cost. As Audrey Macklin writes, “Mr Arar’s ordeal quickly elicited equal shares of 
sympathy toward him and doubt about the integrity of the Canadian government’s conduct”.
74 
This doubt attaches not only to the institutions involved and to Canada’s reputation as a nation, 
but also to the reputation of the political actors and parties under whose watch the mistakes 
occurred. 
It was under a Liberal government (first under Prime Minister Jean Chretien and then under 
Prime Minister Paul Martin between 3 December 2003 and June 2006) that all four men were 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Amnesty International (Canada), “Canada’s position as a global human rights champion slipping, says 
Amnesty International”, Press Release, 10 December 2007(a) (retrieved from http://www.amnesty.ca/ 
resource_centre/news/view.php?load=arcview&article=4140&c=Resource+Centre+News)). 
71 Minister Day has stated that almost all the recommendations have been implemented. There is no 
further detail available on this implementation, however. See Public Safety Canada, “The Government of 
Canada Releases the Iacobucci Internal Inquiry Report”, Press Release, Public Safety Canada, Ottawa, 21 
October 2008(b) (retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2008/nr20081021-eng.aspx). 
72 See “Canada’s pattern of complicity”, editorial, Globe and Mail, 21 October 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081021.weiacobucci22/BNStory/specialComm
ent/home). This editorial also states that the government’s actions have now become part of the historical 
record. 
73 Beyond what occurred in relation to Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin, there is the 
more systemic ‘backlash’ experienced by Muslims and those of Arab origin in Canada, a phenomenon that 
reveals racism and prejudice within Canadian society. See Faisal Bhabha, “The Chill Sets In: National 
Security and the Decline of Equality Rights in Canada” (2005) 54 University of New Brunswick LJ 191 at 
195.  
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detained and tortured. Mr Chretien initially refused to call an inquiry, a decision that Mr Martin 
reversed when he launched the O’Connor inquiry shortly after taking office. Consequently, when 
it comes to probing the actions of political actors in the post-9/11 environment and during the 
detention and mistreatment of Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin, it is 
members of the former Liberal government who are called into question. Former Foreign Affairs 
Minister Bill Graham, for example, became involved in trying to secure Mr Arar’s release. 
Although he was found to have firmly articulated to the Syrians that the government wanted Mr 
Arar returned to Canada,
75 he and the government have nonetheless been criticised for not acting 
fast enough and for making inaccurate statements about Mr Arar’s detention.
76 Of course, Mr 
Chretien’s assertion that an inquiry was not necessary and that the internal review process of the 
RCMP would be sufficient has been proven completely wrong. Moreover, the first part of the 
O’Connor inquiry took place while a Liberal government was in power, and it was under this 
Liberal government that the O’Connor inquiry struggled against extensive claims of 
confidentiality for national security, which threatened to delay and encumber the work of the 
inquiry.
77 
A Conservative government under Mr Harper took office in January 2006, and it was under this 
administration (recently re-elected in October 2008) that the O’Connor reports were released and 
the Iacobucci inquiry launched. It was Mr Harper who apologised to Mr Arar and gave him 
monetary compensation. As Maria Koblanck Della Santina has noted, Mr Harper did not shy 
from taking political advantage of the fact that Mr Arar’s torture had occurred while a Liberal 
government had been in power, referring to as much in the apology itself.
78 This apology was 
welcomed by Mr Arar and noted internationally as a commendable step. Dick Marty wrote in his 
2007 report for PACE (the ‘Marty report’) that the apology and compensation offered to Mr 
Arar were both “ethical and responsible”.
79 Part of the nature of political costs is that the success 
experienced by one party is automatically a cost to another; as such, Mr Harper’s apology 
exacerbated the political cost to the Liberal Party. 
Yet, the Conservative government is also paying a political price in relation to the inquiries as 
well. First, there has been a lack of public action with respect to the recommendations made by 
Commissioner O’Connor. In his apology to Mr Arar, Mr Harper pledged that the Conservative 
government would do “everything in its power” to ensure that the issues raised by the inquiry 
were addressed, and he agreed to act on all recommendations.
80 Upon the completion of the 
Iacobucci inquiry, the minister for public safety stated that the government undertook immediate 
action to implement Commissioner O’Connor’s recommendations and that such implementation 
was “almost complete”.
81 Details on this implementation are not available, however, and as 
                                                      
75 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 38. 
76 Minister Graham said on 14 August 2003 that Arar had had an independent consular visit, which was 
untrue. O’Connor concluded that the minister had not been fully or properly briefed (ibid., p. 44). 
77 See Whitaker (2008), pp. 12–13; see also the O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), pp. 
295 and 299. 
78 “Although the events leading up to this terrible ordeal happened under the previous government”, notes 
the statement (Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister releases letter of apology to Maher 
Arar and his family and announces completion of mediation process”, Press Release, Ottawa, 26 January 
2008 (retrieved from http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1509)). See also Maria Koblanck Della Santina, 
“Special Delivery – The Multilateral Politics of Extraordinary Rendition”, 2009 (forthcoming).  
79 See “Harper’s apology ‘means the world’: Arar”, CBCnews.ca,  26 January 2007 (retrieved from 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/26/harper-apology.html); see also Marty (2007), p. 6.  
80 Whitaker (2008), p. 20. 
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recently noted by Amnesty International Canada, the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties 
Association and Human Rights Watch, action is still desperately needed in the areas of redress, 
accountability, reform, leadership and global action.
82  
As Whitaker (2008) argues, among the other responses for which Canadians continue to wait is 
further information on the source of the government leaks that sought to discredit Mr Arar and 
his wife. These leaks were committed with an “intention to smear the reputation of a man who 
had been kidnapped and tortured, partially as a result of the very actions of those doing the 
leaking…Such behaviour is odious by any reasonable standard of decency.”
83 Although the leaks 
occurred under the previous Liberal government, the burden of following up on unacceptable 
conduct has fallen on the current administration. The call for action falls on the government of 
the day; the work of the inquiry ends when the report is submitted and the action is left to the 
political actors.
84  
Second, it is since the Conservative government has come into power that both inquiries have 
grappled with claims of confidentiality for national security. In particular, this government made 
it clear in the mandate it gave the Iacobucci inquiry that the proceedings were to be conducted 
away from the public view. The Iacobucci inquiry lead counsel explained that “the terms of 
reference basically say, ‘Do this in private unless there’s a very, very compelling reason for 
having parts of it in public’”.
85 This limited mandate has generated much debate, and the very 
private nature of the inquiry was contested by Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati, Mr Nureddin and most 
interveners, in part based on the constitutional principle of openness and the need to inspire 
public confidence through a transparent, public process.
86  
Moreover, it is while the Harper government has been in office that litigation over the redacted 
portions of Commissioner O’Connor’s final reports has occurred.
87 In the end, the Federal Court 
ordered the release of approximately two-thirds of the information the government had 
erroneously concluded should be kept confidential. When this information was released, it was 
revealed for example that CSIS had known of the risk of torture that Mr Arar faced immediately 
after his rendition, as it was a recognised “trend” of the FBI and CIA to render individuals to 
countries to be questioned in a “firm manner”.
88 As Macklin (2008) concludes, the attempt “to 
conceal what could only be characterised as politically embarrassing information under the cloak 
                                                      
82 See the joint letter by Neve et al. (2008), supra note 56.  
83 Whitaker (2008), p. 23. 
84 Dennis R. O’Connor and Freya Kristjanson, “Some Observations on Public Inquiries”, speech delivered 
at the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Annual Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 10 
October 2007 (retrieved from http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/publicinquiries.htm). 
85 Andrew Mayeda, “Lawyer demands Iacobucci inquiry be open to public”, canada.com, 17 February 
2007 (retrieved from http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=aee21c0e-1a42-4420-a8a8-
9913f917296c). 
86 Iacobucci (2008), Appendix C. 
87 What Commissioner O’Connor referred to as “overly broad” national security confidentiality claims, 
A&R, 304. 
88 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar, Addendum: 
Disclosure of information authorized by the Federal Court of Canada in accordance with Sections 38.04 
and 38.06 of the Canada Evidence Act, Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, 2006(d), p. 245 
(retrieved from http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www. 
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of national security confidentiality elicited scathing criticism”.
89 Indeed, the use of national 
security claims in this way “demeans legitimate uses of secrecy”.
90 
The tendency for governments to invoke ‘state secrecy’ to the detriment of adequate 
investigation has been deplored by Amnesty International and recently by Mr Marty during his 
testimony in Italy about the kidnapping of an Italian citizen by American and Italian officials. 
Although he commented that at least in the Italian trials the perpetrators were being brought 
before the judicial process, he argued that the Italian government was preventing the process 
from proceeding by invoking state secrecy “not…to protect secrets – because the facts in 
question are largely known – but rather to protect the civil servants and politicians responsible 
for these abuses”.
91 
4.4  Conclusions on costs 
It may seem that, on the one hand, these categories of costs are related to and aggravated by the 
inquiry process itself. It would indeed be cheaper in all respects not to hold inquiries, public or 
otherwise, or any other thorough form of investigation since investigation appears only to add to 
the monetary, reputational and political costs of government missteps. Nevertheless, although 
costs are revealed and solidified during the inquiry process, these costs were not ‘caused’ by the 
inquiries themselves; rather, they were caused by the various actions of Canadian officials. 
These costs were incurred when the damage was initially perpetrated, not at the moment the 
inquiries were called or when they concluded. That is, the reputation of Canada, its institutions 
and certain individuals were tarnished when officials contributed to the mistreatment and 
detention of Canadian citizens in Syrian jails; the political cost was incurred when there was 
hesitation about initiating an inquiry, through unnecessary claims of censorship, and it is indeed 
still accumulating through continued neglect of Commissioner’s O’Connor’s policy 
recommendations. It was government action of all sorts that created or necessitated these costs, 
not the inquiries themselves.  
Moreover, costs notwithstanding, an inquiry should be viewed as a useful method through which 
policy-makers and leaders can learn how mistakes occurred and how to avoid them in the future. 
Although inquiries may increase costs by opening a window on certain government actions, 
thorough investigations can also help the state mitigate some of the costs endured. For instance, 
the calling of these inquiries was, at a minimum, an acknowledgment that the public and the 
government had to find out what had happened to Mr Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr 
Nureddin, and what role Canadian officials had played in their ordeals. This basic 
acknowledgment of a problem and a public pronouncement of a desire to fix it is an essential 
first step.
92  Public inquiries in particular also help aid the restoration of the reputations of 
institutions and governments. As Justice Peter Cory wrote in an important piece of litigation 
involving a public inquiry, “[i]n times of public questioning, stress and concern [public 
inquiries] provide the means for Canadians to be apprised of the conditions pertaining to a 
worrisome community problem and to be a part of the recommendations that are aimed at 
                                                      
89 See Macklin (2008); see also Whitaker (2008), p. 14. 
90 Whitaker (2008).  
91 Council of Europe, “Dick Marty testifying at the Abu Omar trial in Milan: ‘Let justice take its course!’”, 
Press Release, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 November 2008 (retrieved from http://assembly.coe.int/ 
ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=2095).  
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resolving the problem”.
93 Commissions of inquiry are costly, but these costs are the by-product 
of a process that plays a vital role along the path to proper accountability and resolution.  
5. Findings 
5.1 Summary  of  the  findings of the O’Connor inquiry 
The O’Connor inquiry was a public inquiry mandated to accomplish two broad tasks. First, the 
inquiry was instructed to investigate into and report on the actions of Canadian officials in 
relation to Mr Arar. This investigation and report was to have specific regard for Mr Arar’s 
detention by US officials in the US, his deportation to Jordon and Syria, his treatment in Syria, 
his eventual return to Canada and any other circumstance directly related to Mr Arar that 
Commissioner O’Connor considered relevant to fulfilling the mandate given to him. Second, 
Commissioner O’Connor was directed to make policy recommendations about the creation of a 
review mechanism for the RCMP’s national security activities.
94 The report on the events 
relating to Mr Arar was released on 18 September 2006 and the report on the RCMP review 
mechanism was released on 12 December 2006. Some of the specific findings of the O’Connor 
inquiry are presented below. 
5.1.1  Finding: Mr Arar’s reputation 
The inquiry was not intended to be an inquiry into whether Mr Arar had committed any offence. 
Nonetheless, Commissioner O’Connor was conscious of the obvious impact the inquiry would 
have on Mr Arar’s reputation. Although acknowledging the difficulty of “proving a negative”, 
Commissioner O’Connor was able “to say categorically that there is no evidence to indicate that 
Mr Arar has committed any offence or that his activities constitute a threat to the security of 
Canada”.
95 
Furthermore, Commissioner O’Connor also accepted the findings of a report released by 
Stephen Toope in October 2005, who concluded that Mr Arar had been tortured while 
imprisoned in Syria, thereby confirming what Mr Arar had been saying since his release.
96 The 
inquiry also condemned government leaks that had occurred after Mr Arar’s return to Canada 
and even during the inquiry itself. These leaks strove to cast doubt upon Mr Arar’s story while 
protecting the government and its officials,
97 and the inquiry revealed these leaks for the 
deliberate, misleading and disturbing acts that they were.
98  
5.1.2  Finding: Information sharing  
The inquiry found that the RCMP shared information with the American authorities about Mr 
Arar before he was sent to Syria, and that this information was often imprecise, unfair and 
                                                      
93 The author would like to thank Nigel Marshman for stressing the importance of this point (telephone 
interview with Nigel Marshman, former Commission Counsel with the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar, Ottawa, 15 December 2008). See also the case 
Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, para. 
62. 
94 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 10.  
95 Ibid., p. 59. 
96 Ibid., p. 188; see also the Toope report (2005), p. 19. 
97 See also Macklin (2008), p. 16. 
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inaccurate. Moreover, in what Commissioner O’Connor refers to as “alarming” practices, this 
information was shared in a manner contrary to RCMP policy and contrary to the intentions of 
senior RCMP officials who had not intended that existing RCMP policy be put aside.
99 More 
specifically, the information provided to the American authorities had not been screened for 
relevance, reliability or personal information, thus contravening internal RCMP policy. The 
RCMP was also found to have broken its own policy by not attaching caveats to information sent 
about Mr Arar, which typically stipulate how the information can be used. Commissioner 
O’Connor held that this increased the risk that the information would be used for purposes of 
which the RCMP would not approve. In what Commissioner O’Connor referred to as the “most 
serious incident” of information sharing in contravention of existing RCMP practices, the entire 
investigative database for Project A-O was supplied to US authorities without screening or 
caveats.
100  
Furthermore, the RCMP also requested that Canadian and US authorities add Mr Arar’s name 
and that of his wife Monia Mazigh to border lookout systems.
101 Commissioner O’Connor found 
that the RCMP had no basis for its description of Mr Arar and Ms Mazigh in the American 
request as “Islamic [e]xtremist individuals”, and that there was no basis for the “terrorism” 
lookout requested of the Canadian border authorities.
102 Commissioner O’Connor notes 
numerous other instances where inaccurate and unfair information was shared with the 
Americans, such as the RCMP’s assertion that Mr Arar had refused to be interviewed when in 
fact Mr Arar had agreed to the interview and had merely asked for certain conditions to be 
respected. Overall, it was revealed that the RCMP had provided information about Mr Arar had 
been inaccurate, overstated his importance in RCMP investigations and portrayed him in an 
“unduly negative fashion”. Crucially, it was held to be likely that US authorities had relied on 
information given to them by the RCMP when making the decision to detain and question Mr 
Arar in New York and to deport Mr Arar to Syria.
103  
5.1.3  Finding: Other actions during Mr Arar’s detention in Syria 
Some of the other actions on the part of Canadian officials from DFAIT, CSIS and the RCMP 
during Mr Arar’s detention in Syria raised serious concerns and were found to have had an effect 
on the length of time it took to get Mr Arar released. For instance, it was noted at several points 
in Commissioner O’Connor’s first report that the three Canadian agencies had failed to work 
together to win Mr Arar’s release. As Macklin (2008) writes, the agencies “could not even agree 
to ask Syria to release and return Mr Arar to Canada”.
104 By the time a letter from the prime 
minister was eventually sent to Syria expressing Canada’s desire to have Mr Arar returned, 
months had passed since Canadian authorities had first decided that there should be an official 
reply to Syrian assertions that not all agencies in Canada (specifically, CSIS) desired Mr Arar’s 
return.  
                                                      
99 Ibid., pp. 24, 77, 110 and 130.  
100 Ibid., pp. 24 and 100–01; see also pp. 114–15 for a list of inaccuracies. 
101 Ibid., pp. 13 and 19. Of the Americans, the RCMP requested that Mr Arar and his wife be placed in the 
US Customs’ Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Domestically, the RCMP 
requested that what is now the Canada Border Services Agency place ‘terrorism’ lookouts for Mr Arar and 
his wife.  
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., p. 140. 
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There are also specific instances where the actions of the three agencies appeared to work 
counter to efforts to win Mr Arar’s release. For example, DFAIT, specifically former 
Ambassador Pillerella, distributed the summary of information gleaned from Mr Arar’s 
interrogation by Syrian officials to CSIS and the RCMP without noting that the statement was 
probably a product of torture. CSIS was also found to have received information from Syrian 
intelligence officials without adequately assessing its reliability on the basis that it could have 
been the product of torture. Furthermore, during the time of Mr Arar’s detention, the RCMP sent 
questions to Syrian intelligence officials for Mr Almalki (who was also being held in Syria), 
which likely sent signals to Syrian intelligence officials that Mr Arar was considered a serious 
threat. 
5.1.4 Overarching  themes 
The findings of the O’Connor inquiry are captured in three large volumes and they go through 
the events and actions of Canadian officials in meticulous detail. In addition to the specific 
findings outlined above, certain themes can be extracted from the findings that contribute to a 
broader understanding of the climate and practices that led to Mr Arar’s detention and torture. It 
could be suggested that these themes reflect challenges and difficulties common to many 
countries that are struggling to deal with the threat of terrorism. 
The lack of accuracy and precision in the sharing of information 
Although the sharing of information was highlighted as one of the likely contributing factors to 
Mr Arar’s detention and mistreatment in Syria, Commissioner O’Connor notes that information 
should be shared among law enforcement agencies in different countries. This information must 
only be shared in a suitably “principled and consistent” manner, however.
105 Time and again, 
Commissioner O’Connor emphasises the problem of the imprecise, inaccurate information that 
was used and shared by Canadian officials.
106 This was a practice for which Commissioner 
O’Connor said there was no excuse.
107 The nature of the intelligence-gathering process is one 
whereby “every bit of information” should be shared because “it might turn out to be the missing 
piece of the puzzle”.
108 Still, as was demonstrated in the case of Mr Arar, every little bit of faulty 
information may pose a risk to an individual, even if the pieces may seem small and insignificant 
in isolation.  
‘Mixed signals’ and the weight of labels 
Commissioner O’Connor notes numerous times that the labels attached to individuals, such as 
those given to Mr Arar, have a way of “sticking” and creating dangerous misperceptions.
109 
These labels send signals to other countries about how the individual is perceived by their home 
country. Labels are sometimes overt and deliberately placed by the home country, such as the 
label of “Islamic [e]xtremist” attached to Mr Arar and his wife by the RCMP.
110 On the other 
                                                      
105 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), pp. 333, 22 and 102. 
106 For instance, ibid., p. 83; see also Roach (2007), p. 56. 
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hand, labels may also be accumulated or implied by the actions of state officials. For instance, 
Commissioner O’Connor writes that the provision of questions for Mr Almalki (who officials 
associated with Mr Arar) by the RCMP to Syrian intelligence officials, through the Canadian 
ambassador himself, likely sent the signal that Mr Almalki’s detention was approved of, and 
therefore put Mr Arar at greater risk. Moreover, Commissioner O’Connor expressed some 
concern at the visit the CSIS made to Syria to meet with Syrian intelligence officials while Mr 
Arar was being detained in Syria (as well as Mr Almalki), a country with a suspect human rights 
record, as it is important that Canada not appear to encourage or condone abuse of human 
rights.
111 
Interagency cooperation  
Just as international cooperation and information sharing are necessary features of the fight 
against terrorism, so too is proper cooperation among domestic agencies. Moreover, this inter-
agency cooperation is crucial to ensuring a coherent domestic approach able to prevent the 
mistreatment of citizens.
112 Commissioner O’Connor found that throughout the period Mr Arar 
was held in New York by American officials, during which time the RCMP supplied 
information to American officials, the RCMP was not made aware of the possibility that the 
Americans were considering sending Mr Arar to Syria until several days after consular officials 
with DFAIT were informed of this possibility by Mr Arar’s brother and Mr Arar himself.
113 
DFAIT and RCMP were both dealing directly with US authorities at the same time, without the 
benefit of the information the other agency had.
114 
A further example of information breakdown is found in the instance when then-Foreign 
Minister Bill Graham was not informed of the working assumption of the director general of the 
Consular Affairs Bureau that Mr Arar had been tortured during his initial period of interrogation 
in Syria. As Commissioner O’Connor wrote, “that led to an undesirable situation: the Canadian 
minister responsible for managing Mr Arar’s situation while he was detained in Syria was not 
properly informed of what should have been viewed as a critically important element”.
115  
Training and awareness 
It is clear that better policies for dealing with countries with suspect human rights records, as 
well as better training for agency employees, are essential. Commissioner O’Connor found that 
RCMP investigators on Project A-O lacked training and experience in national security 
investigations and in how to address the various issues (such as human rights and cultural 
sensitivity issues) that could arise.
116 Especially given this situation, Commissioner O’Connor 
argues that senior RCMP officials needed to have exerted better oversight than they did. 
Commissioner O’Connor also raised concerns about training provided to Canadian consular 
officials. For instance, the Canadian consul in Syria who met with Mr Arar several times 
throughout his imprisonment had no training in observing the signs of torture.
117 Although there 
were indications in Mr Arar’s first interview that all was not well, this concern was not noted by 
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the Canadian consul in any meaningful way.
118 Furthermore, despite widely acknowledged 
concerns about Syria’s treatment of prisoners and DFAIT’s own reports, the Canadian 
ambassador to Syria was not operating under a “working assumption” that Mr Arar had been 
tortured,
119 although some other DFAIT officials were.
120 
5.1.5 Recommendations 
Out of the O’Connor inquiry came two sets of recommendations: first, recommendations 
associated with the findings with respect to Mr Arar and the actions of Canadian officials; 
second, policy recommendations specifically made about the new review and oversight 
mechanism for the RCMP. Note that there were no recommendations made by the Iacobucci 
inquiry, in accordance with its mandate.
121 
From the factual review process 
Most of the recommendations at the end of the factual inquiry involve, as Whitaker (2008) 
writes, formalising and increasing the precision of existing policy.
122 After all, one of the key 
problems in the agencies was not necessarily the lack of policy surrounding the investigation 
into which Mr Arar figured, but the failure to follow existing policy.  
The 23 recommendations resulting from the factual inquiry included suggestions for the 
formalising of mandate and inter-agency agreements in national security investigations and for 
the training and oversight of RCMP officers, while encouraging information sharing between 
domestic and international agencies provided that important policies and protocols are followed 
(Recommendations 1-7). The recommendations emphasised the need for all agencies to ensure 
the accuracy and reliability of properly screened information, and the importance of written 
caveats (Recommendations 8-9).  
The recommendations also suggested that formal complaints should be lodged when information 
shared with foreign agencies has been improperly used (Recommendation 12), and that policies 
should be developed to ensure a coordinated response in the event that a Canadian is detained 
abroad “in connection with terrorism-related activity” (Recommendation 16). The 
recommendations highlighted the need for better communication among domestic agencies, such 
as through the dissemination of DFAIT’s annual reports on the human rights records of various 
countries (Recommendation 13). The recommendations addressed the need for better training of 
officials (Recommendations 17 and 20) and the problems encountered in the Arar case 
concerning detainee privacy rights (Recommendation 18). Moreover, policies should be 
established in relation to information sharing with countries with dubious human rights records, 
in order to prevent Canadian complicity in the torture of those abroad (Recommendations 14-15) 
and to prevent investigations from being carried out on the basis of racial, ethnic or religious 
profiling (Recommendation 19). 
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Finally, the recommendations stemming from the factual inquiry suggested new policy be 
formulated with respect to border lookouts (Recommendation 21), that formal objections be 
registered with the US and Syria with respect to Mr Arar’s treatment (Recommendation 22) and 
that Mr Arar be compensated and given a formal apology (Recommendation 23).
123 
From the policy review process 
The policy review process, the second part of the inquiry, was designed to focus on establishing 
a new review and oversight mechanism for the RCMP, and continued in some sense from the 
recommendation in the factual report that “the RCMP’s information-sharing practices and 
arrangements should be subject to review by an independent, arms-length review body” 
(Recommendation 10). Commissioner O’Connor proposed the creation of the Independent 
Complaints and National Security Review Agency (ICRA): an independent, arms-length 
mechanism for both the review and the handling of complaints.
124 ICRA would be given 
substantial investigatory powers
125 and be able to conduct self-initiated reviews, investigate and 
report on complaints, conduct “joint” reviews alongside other review bodies and launch an 
investigation on ministerial request.
126  
Commissioner O’Connor also recommended independent reviews be conducted of the national 
security activities of various Canadian departments,
127 and that “statutory gateways” be created 
to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information among the various review agencies.
128 
This new review process is designed to do several things: to review the RCMP’s national 
security practices for compliance with the law and fundamental values,
129 to foster accountability 
to the government and at the same time to facilitate the government’s accountability for the 
RCMP,
130 to foster the RCMP’s accountability to the public, and to inspire public trust and 
confidence in the RCMP.
131 These goals go hand-in-hand with a fourth objective of a review 
mechanism: to ensure that any review instrument would not impair national security.
132 An 
understanding of the need for adequate review in a sensitive national security context can be 
seen in Recommendation 5g, where the ICRA complaints process is intended to be open and 
transparent, but may be conducted in private if necessary. 
5.2 Summary  of  the  findings  of the Iacobucci inquiry 
The Iacobucci inquiry was charged with determining whether the detention or mistreatment of 
Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati or Mr Nureddin was the result of the actions of Canadian officials. In 
particular, the commissioner was directed to inquire into the action of sharing information with 
foreign countries. Furthermore, Commissioner Iacobucci was directed to determine whether, if 
the actions of Canadian officials were found to have contributed in some manner to the detention 
or mistreatment of these three men, those actions were deficient in the circumstances. Finally, 
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the inquiry was directed to determine whether the actions undertaken by Canadian officials to 
provide consular services to these the men during their detention was deficient in the 
circumstances.
133 
To make these determinations, Commissioner Iacobucci used the following tests. First, the 
commissioner asked “whether, on a consideration of all of the evidence and the rational 
inferences to be drawn from it, the actions can be said to have likely contributed to the detention 
or mistreatment of the individual concerned”.
134 Second, in determining whether the actions of 
Canadian officials or the provision of consular services were deficient in the circumstances, the 
commissioner defined “deficient” conduct as “conduct falling short of a norm”.
135 Commissioner 
Iacobucci’s findings are presented below. 
5.2.1  Finding: Canadian officials’ contribution to detention 
It was found that Canadian officials had contributed indirectly to the detention of Mr Elmaati 
and Mr Nureddin in Syria. More specifically, this contribution had resulted from the sharing of 
information, which was judged deficient conduct in the circumstances, in both cases.
136 As 
Commissioner Iacobucci wrote about the case of Mr Elmaati, “officials should have considered 
that describing a dual Egyptian-Canadian citizen as an imminent threat in a communication to 
Syrian and Egyptian police might expose that individual to the risk of being detained and 
mistreated in those countries if he were to travel there”.
137 Commissioner Iacobucci noted that he 
was unable to determine whether Canadian officials had contributed indirectly to the detention of 
Mr Almalki based on the evidence he had before him during the inquiry. 
5.2.2 Finding:  Torture 
Commissioner Iacobucci received submissions on whether his terms of reference required him to 
determine whether Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin had been subject to torture.
138 He 
determined that he was mandated to examine this issue. He found that Mr Almalki and Mr 
Nureddin had suffered torture while detained in Syria, and that Mr Elmaati had been tortured in 
both Syria and Egypt. In coming to this conclusion, Commissioner Iacobucci was able to use 
evidence from the Toope report (which contained information obtained from Mr Toope’s 
interviews with all three men), although he also conducted an independent examination into this 
issue, using his own interviews with the men and advice from experts on torture and its 
effects.
139 
5.2.3  Finding: Canadian officials’ contribution to mistreatment 
Canadian officials contributed indirectly to the mistreatment (which itself amounted to torture) 
of Mr Elmaati in Syria and Egypt, and to the mistreatment of Mr Almalki and Mr Nureddin in 
Syria. The actions of Canadian officials in these respects were judged deficient in the 
circumstances. 
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5.2.4  Finding: Canadian officials’ provision of consular services 
Canadian officials’ provision of consular services to Mr Elmaati and Mr Almalki was deficient 
in the circumstances, in a number of respects.  
5.2.5 Overarching  themes 
As was the case with the findings of the O’Connor inquiry, several broad themes can be taken 
from the Iacobucci inquiry’s report.  
Information sharing and cooperation 
The Iacobucci report is replete with instances where Canadian officials shared information and 
cooperated with foreign agencies, and where these actions contributed to the mistreatment or 
detention of the three Canadian men. For example, CSIS sent questions to Syria to be asked of 
Mr Elmaati and the RCMP sent questions to Syria to be asked of Mr Almalki.
140 The RCMP 
shared information about Mr Elmaati while he was in Egypt and attempted to interview him,
141 
and both CSIS and the RCMP were found to have shared information with foreign agencies that 
indirectly contributed to Mr Nureddin’s detention.
142 Commissioner Iacobucci also found that 
the RCMP had failed to attach caveats to Mr Elmaati’s flight itinerary before sharing it with 
American officials.
143 Furthermore, Commissioner Iacobucci found CSIS’s approach to the 
labelling of individuals in communications with foreign agencies inadequate and that this 
inadequate practice put the labelled person at risk.
144 
Deficient consular services 
The provision of consular services was a particular focus of the Iacobucci inquiry, and one area 
where Canadian actions were found to be deficient with respect to the help provided to Mr 
Almalki and Mr Elmaati. It was found that Canadian DFAIT officials did not do enough to 
locate Mr Elmaati after he was originally detained in Syria nor when he was later transferred to 
Egypt,
145 nor did they act promptly when learning of Mr Almalki’s detention.
146 Furthermore, 
DFAIT disclosed information collected during consular visits to Mr Elmaati and Mr Almalki to 
other Canadian officials when it should not have.
147 Commissioner Iacobucci also found that the 
failure of other Canadian officials, those with the RCMP, CSIS and DFAIT’s foreign 
intelligence branch, to inform DFAIT’s consular division that Mr Elmaati had been detained in 
Syria contributed to the mistreatment of Mr Elmaati.
148  
Poor training 
As had been revealed in the O’Connor inquiry, the Iacobucci inquiry found that DFAIT consular 
staff were unable to assess properly whether Mr Elmaati had been mistreated.
149 Moreover, there 
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was no protocol in place for dealing with allegations of torture or policies requiring consular 
officials to request private meetings with the detained citizen.
150  
In relation to CSIS, Commissioner Iacobucci repeated what had been found in the O’Connor 
inquiry: there was no one within CSIS who was trained in assessing whether certain information 
or intelligence was the product of torture.
151  
Furthermore, it was found that the RCMP should have taken into consideration, as directed by 
internal policy, the human rights record of Syria when providing information to Syrian officials 
about Mr Almalki. As Commissioner Iacobucci wrote, “[RCMP] Officials should have 
considered that describing a dual Syrian-Canadian citizen as an ‘imminent threat’ in a 
communication to Syrian police might expose that individual to the risk of being detained and 
mistreated in Syria if he were to travel there”.
152 As further illustration of insufficient training 
and awareness on the part of the RCMP, one RCMP official recalled that when discussing 
whether or not to send questions to the Syrians to be posed to Mr Almalki, he thought a DFAIT 
official’s suggestion that sending the questions could put Mr Almalki at risk of torture was “off 
the wall absurd” and that communicating that concern to the Syrians would be a “slap in the 
face”.
153 
5.3  From the two inquiries: A summary of the actions of Canadian 
officials 
5.3.1  What Canadian officials were found to have done 
The O’Connor and Iacobucci inquiries serve to draw our attention to instances where Canadian 
officials have played a role; however, that role was ultimately defined by the inquiries into the 
detention and mistreatment of four Canadian citizens. In summary, between the findings of both 
inquiries, Canadian officials were found to have contributed to the detention and torture of these 
men, to have offered deficient consular services and to have breached internal agency protocol. 
Furthermore, significant problems were found with the status quo pertaining to inter-agency 
communication and cooperation, training, policy, accountability and oversight, with agencies 
often acting without sufficient regard to their own policies or reports. It is true that with the 
exception of the government leaks concerning Mr Arar, the inquiries did not find that officials’ 
actions had been malicious or necessarily deliberate. Nevertheless, the net effect of the actions of 
Canadian officials was that the rights and security of Canadian citizens in the most vulnerable of 
positions were not given full protection.  
5.3.2 Harmful  cooperation 
Of particular note are the instances where the problematic actions of Canadian officials were 
undertaken in the spirit of cooperation with other states. As discussed above in section 3 on 
context, the environment in which the actions of the Canadian officials occurred was one 
familiar to European nations as well as to Canada, and one in which cooperation among agencies 
moved to the forefront.
154 “There was intense pressure on intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, including CSIS and the RCMP, to cooperate and share information with foreign 
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agencies, particularly those of the United States”, wrote Commissioner Iacobucci.
155 It is within 
this context that established policies fell by the wayside and some existing practices proved 
severely deficient.
156  
At times the preference for cooperation over a strenuous safeguarding of the rights of the 
Canadian detainees is stark: for example, the RCMP did not consider the issue of whether 
sharing Mr Elmaati’s itinerary would cause him to be detained, because at the time the primary 
concern of the RCMP was the threat to the US.
157 Another instance of the careful way in which 
cooperation was facilitated, to the proven detriment of the Canadian citizens involved is in the 
submission of questions to the Syrian authorities. The practice of sending questions to a foreign 
agency for use in the questioning of Canadian citizens held abroad is an example of cooperation 
and one that – in different circumstances – may not be cause for criticism.
158  
In these circumstances, however, the provision of questions to the Syrian authorities contributed 
to the mistreatment of Mr Almalki and Mr Elmaati, and sent the wrong signal to Syrian officials 
with respect to Mr Arar. This is a clear case of cooperation being preferred above the need to 
ensure the security of Canadian citizens held abroad. In January 2003, when both Mr Arar and 
Mr Almalki were held in Syria, Ambassador Pillerella passed on to Syrian intelligence officials, 
through Consul Leo Martel, questions provided by the RCMP to be asked of Mr Almalki. He 
decided that it was appropriate to send these questions given that he did not think the Syrians 
would mistreat “another” Canadian and given the spirit of “extraordinary unprecedented 
cooperation” that the Syrians had displayed with respect to Mr Arar.
159 Yet, Commissioner 
Iacobucci found that the sending of these questions had contributed indirectly to the 
mistreatment of Mr Almalki in Syria.
160 Canadian officials were aware of the risk that this 
created for Mr Almalki,
161 and as Commissioner Iacobucci writes, “where officials determine 
that a proposed action is likely to result in a particular outcome, and that outcome materialises, I 
believe it is reasonable to infer, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the action 
resulted, at least indirectly, in the outcome”.
162 
Moreover, the provision of these questions for Mr Almalki hindered Mr Arar’s much sought-
after release. Although the Canadian ambassador was found by Commissioner O’Connor to have 
exercised good judgment in not wanting to provoke Syrian officials, who were providing 
“unprecedented” consular access to Mr Arar,
163 the provision of questions for Mr Almalki went 
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beyond what good judgment would have necessitated and could have led the Syrians to believe 
that the RCMP considered Mr Arar to be a serious threat.
164 
The practice of sending questions to foreign agencies also had a negative effect on Mr Elmaati. 
In this case, CSIS sent questions to a foreign agency that were then to be sent on to Syria and 
asked of Mr Elmaati. CSIS’s explanation for this course of action was that they wanted to test 
the accuracy of the information contained in the alleged confession Mr Elmaati had made while 
in Syrian custody, but Commissioner Iacobucci found that this action contributed to the 
mistreatment of Mr Elmaati while in Syria. He writes that “it is reasonable to infer that Mr 
Elmaati’s mistreatment by Syrian officials resulted indirectly, at least in part, from sending 
questions to be asked of Mr Elmaati by Syrian officials”.
165 They would have likely viewed the 
receipt of questions from the Canadians as a ‘green light’ to continue their treatment and 
detention of Mr Elmaati, and thus the actions of Canadian official amounted to deficient 
conduct. 
The sending of questions abroad seems in the same problematic vein as the actions of some 
European officials (specifically from the UK and Germany) as well as those from Turkey who 
visited detainees in questionable detention situations to conduct interrogations.
166 Florian Geyer 
condemns this practice as “hardly legal or justifiable”, and writes that the only acceptable role 
officials should play in visiting detainees is to provide assistance or to help build their case 
against their unlawful detention or extraordinary rendition.
167  
5.3.3 Consular  services 
The provision of consular services should be flagged as a state obligation necessarily implicated 
in allegations of mistreatment of a state’s citizens abroad. The provision of consular services is 
an important tool available to a state to ensure the rights of its citizens are protected, and fits 
alongside the obligations related to the prevention of and protection from torture. The provision 
of proper consular services can be complicated by dual citizenship, and although DFAIT’s 
policy is to not provide consular services to citizens “in the country of their nationality if that 
country does not recognize the prisoner’s Canadian citizenship”, it was also acknowledged by 
Canadian officials that dual nationality should not affect the “intensity of activity” that the case 
of a dual citizen receives.
168  
The provision of consular services is further complicated by the necessary reliance on the 
judgment of consular officials who work in what are potentially extremely sensitive and serious 
situations. During the O’Connor inquiry, one Canadian official stated that the “extraordinary” 
consular access Canadian officials had to Mr Arar in Syria could be attributed at least partly to 
the good working relationship between Ambassador Pillarella and the head of Syrian 
intelligence, General Hassan Khalil.
169 Still, it was also in this “extraordinary” cooperative 
context that Ambassador Pillarella passed along the RCMP questions to be asked of Mr Almalki.  
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In addition, it is imperative that states follow up when other nations have breached their 
obligations concerning consular assistance. For instance, in the case of Mr Arar, it was found 
that American officials might not have fulfilled their obligations under the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Services by failing to contact the Canadian consulate in New York after Mr Arar 
had requested consular assistance.
170 A Canadian official testifying before the O’Connor inquiry 
indicated that the obligation to inform a detainee of his right to consular services and to facilitate 
such services without delay has been a “problem area” when dealing with American officials 
since 9/11.
171  
5.3.4  The human rights duality in anti-terrorism practices 
Both inquiries recognised that there is a need to better balance the necessary inter-agency and 
inter-state cooperation with the requirements of Canadian law and fundamental values. In other 
words, both inquiries reveal a failure on the part of Canadian officials to respect the dual human 
rights aspects as required in Canada’s anti-terrorism response.
172 On the one hand, information 
sharing is an essential part of the investigative process.
173 In explaining the importance of 
information sharing between agencies and countries, O’Connor wrote that information sharing 
has become more important since 9/11, and that there is no room for “stand-alone” or isolated 
investigations into terrorist activities.
174  
At the same time, it is also clear that policy-makers need to be cognisant of the reality that 
information shared by Canada can have an effect beyond Canada’s control and of the limits of 
Canadian law to ensure that the information is used in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution.
175 Diplomatic assurances or those requested by individual agencies have proven 
time and again to be neither effective nor sufficient: Mr Arar’s torture in Syria, for instance, 
occurred “despite an assurance to the contrary”.
176 Commissioner O’Connor looked to the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Suresh case, where the court “emphasized that 
while powerful tools are needed to effectively meet the threat of terrorism, it would be too great 
a price if terrorism were defeated at the cost of sacrificing our commitment to the values that are 
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6. Investigations 
6.1 European  investigations 
Before looking at the commission of inquiry model that Canada used with the O’Connor and 
Iacobucci inquiries, it is useful to keep in mind some of the ways in which European 
governments have investigated the actions of their officials in relation to the mistreatment of 
European citizens. Since 2005, when the news of possible secret detention facilities in Europe 
became widely publicised, there have been extensive investigations conducted by non-state 
bodies. The Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights appointed Dick 
Marty as rapporteur on this issue, and his report was released on 12 June 2006. The European 
Parliament established a Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the 
CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, whose rapporteur Giovanni Claudio 
Fava released his report in January 2007 (the ‘Fava report’). Both reports found that several 
European governments cooperated with CIA rendition flights and secret detention facilities. 
Amnesty International has also been highly critical of the lack of action – and the complicity – 




As the two reports make clear, European countries appear to have cooperated with rendition 
flights,
179 hosted secret detention facilities
180 and seen their citizens or residents detained and 
mistreated abroad.
181 Some of the more notorious cases were highlighted in the two reports.  
For instance, Abu Omar, a man who had been granted asylum by Italy, was abducted in Milan 
with the help of Italian officials and transferred to Egypt for detention and torture. Charges have 
been levelled against Italian and American officials as a result.
182 Italian citizen Abou Elkassim 
Britel was also detained abroad, but no charges resulted from the Italian investigation into this 
case.
183 The Fava report notes that at least four UK residents were rendered to facilities including 
Guantanamo Bay, and in at least two instances the detention may have resulted from the 
provision of false information by UK officials.
184 The Fava report also commented on the cases 
of German citizens Khaled El-Masri and Mohammed Zammar, as well as German residents 
Abdel-Halim Khafagy and Murat Kurnaz, and notes evidence of German government 
involvement in the detention and mistreatment of these men.
185 
Two men applying for asylum in Sweden were expelled from the country with only diplomatic 
assurances that the men would be treated in accordance with international law. Sweden’s 
conduct in this affair has been criticised by the UN Human Rights Committee, which found that 
Sweden had violated the UN Convention against Torture.
186 Furthermore, in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, six men (four of whom were citizens and two of whom were residents) became 
victims of extraordinary rendition and they were eventually flown to detention in Guantanamo 
Bay.
187 
6.1.2 Legal  obligations 
While finalising his report, Mr Marty requested that the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (the ‘Venice Commission’) provide his committee with an opinion on the legality 
of secret detention centres in European nations and the obligations European nations have with 
respect to the use of their jurisdiction for the transport of detainees. In their detailed opinion, the 
Venice Commission advised among other things that cooperation with secret detention facilities 
engages the responsibilities of European nations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Furthermore, the transfer of prisoners through a European nation’s territory or airspace 
triggers that nation’s obligation to ensure that the detainee does not face the risk of torture and to 
prevent possible mistreatment.
188  
Moreover, individuals such as Thomas Hammarberg (the Council of Europe’s commissioner for 
human rights) and Mr Fava have stressed that European nations have an obligation, at a 
minimum, to investigate their potential human rights violations.
189 Mr Hammarberg has called 
on European nations to fulfil their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and to ensure that “the full truth about European cooperation with the secret detention and 
unlawful rendition programmes” is exposed.
190  
6.1.3 Investigations 
For the most part, the investigations that have taken place in European countries have focused on 
allegations of cooperation with CIA-led rendition and unlawful detention practices. 
Investigations in various forms have been started and some completed, although there has been 
much criticism about the way in which several European states have used claims of 
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confidentiality for national security to hamper investigations.
191 In addition, there has been very 
little acknowledgment of government involvement in the rendition programme.
192  
Romania established an inquiry committee into the alleged secret detention facilities on its 
territory, an inquiry that has been criticised for the narrow scope of its investigation and for the 
fact that the final report was almost entirely private.
193 What is more, the report “categorically” 
denied the possibility of secret detention facilities in Romania, a conclusion that Mr Fava could 
not agree with given that no definitive evidence has been put forward to contradict the evidence 
of such facilities.
194 Despite the finding of Mr Marty that CIA detention facilities have existed in 
both Romania and Poland,
195 Poland maintains that such allegations are false and in any case 
have been adequately investigated. Still, as the International Commission of Jurists argues, the 
Polish government has not made the report of its investigation public and has not addressed the 
allegations that it permitted CIA rendition flights to stop in its territory.
196  
In Sweden, the Parliamentary Ombudsman investigated the cases of Ahmed Agiza and 
Mohammed El Zari. Mr Agiza has been awarded compensation, although the Swedish 
government has not accepted responsibility for the suffering Mr Agiza endured. The Swedish 
government’s handling of this investigation has been criticised by the UN Committee against 
Torture
197 and the Human Rights Committee in Alzery v. Sweden.
198 The International 
Commission of Jurists was also sharply critical of the Swedish government for not instituting 
criminal investigations.
199 
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In Italy, there are ongoing prosecutions of some of the individuals involved in the kidnapping 
and rendition of Abu Omar, including over 20 Americans.
200 Mr Marty called the investigation 
into the events surrounding Mr Omar’s abduction a “remarkably competent and independent 
investigation”.
201 This prosecution remains one of the few that has occurred in nations alleged to 
have cooperated in the mistreatment of their citizens.
202 Even so, the Italian prosecution was 
postponed in early December 2008 to allow the Constitutional Court to rule on the government’s 
bid to prevent secret agents from testifying.
203 
A German parliamentary committee of inquiry is currently investigating Germany’s role in the 
cases of rendition and mistreatment of Mr Kurnaz, Mr Zammar and Mr Masri. The effectiveness 
of the inquiry has been questioned, however, after the invocation of “state secrecy” by the 
government in order to limit the material available to the inquiry.
204 There have also been 
investigations launched by German prosecutors and arrest warrants issued for CIA officials 
involved in the Masri case,
205 but the prosecution has “run into the sand”, in the words of Mr 
Marty, and the extradition of those under warrant is not being sought.
206 
In Spain, it has been reported that in 2002 the government granted permission to the US 
authorities to use Spain for the stopovers of flights taking prisoners to Cuba, ostensibly in cases 
of emergency only. The current government claims it had no knowledge of this practice, and said 
it would launch an internal investigation.
207 This is in addition to judicial inquiries underway, 
such as the one launched by police in Majorca in 2005.
208 
Both Macedonia and the UK also used investigatory models within their parliamentary systems: 
a Macedonian parliamentary committee examined the Macedonian government’s involvement in 
the rendition of Mr Masri and concluded that security services had acted within their authority 
throughout. The International Commission of Jurists has nonetheless criticised the government’s 
                                                      
200 The request for extradition to Italy of the American suspects has been refused by the US. See Louis 
Fischer, “Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy”, (2008) 57 American University L Rev. 1405 at 
1435; see also Marty (2007), para. 316. 
201 Marty (2006), para. 231. 
202 See the joint letter by Neve et al. (2008), supra note 56; see also the State of Denial report by Amnesty 
International (2008b), p. 27. 
203 See “Italy: CIA Rendition Trial Postponed Pending Secrecy Ruling”, adnkronos international,  3 
December 2008 (retrieved from http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.2779504103). 
Previous difficulties during the prosecution, caused by government reluctance, are noted by Dick Marty in 
Marty (2006), para. 231. 
204 Marty (2007), para. 310. 
205 See Craig Whitlock, “Europeans Probe Secret CIA Flights”, washingtonpost.com, 17 November 2005 
(retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602198. 
html); see also Fischer (2008), p. 1435. 
206 See the Council of Europe (2008) press release.  
207 See Statewatch, “Damning evidence surfaces of Aznar government collusion in Guantánamo flights”, 
Statewatch Observatory on “Rendition”, Statewatch, London, 4 December 2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html); see also Fiona Govan, “Spain ‘Authorized’ CIA 
rendition flights”, telegraph.co.uk, 1 December 2008 (retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/europe/spain/3538908/Spain-authorised-CIA-rendition-flights.html). 
208 See Stephen Grey and Renwick McLean, “Spain Examines ‘Rendition’ Flights”, International Herald 
Tribune, 14 November 2005 (retrieved from http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/14/news/spain.php); see 
also International Commission of Jurists, “Human Rights Committee Consideration of the 5th Periodic 
Report of Spain International Commission of Jurists Submission on list of issues”, ICJ, Geneva, 2008(a) 
(retrieved from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICJSpain93.pdf). INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DETENTION AND ABUSE OF CITIZENS ABROAD | 35 
 
failure to initiate a truly independent and thorough review of the matter, and agreed with the 
finding of the Marty report that the parliamentary investigation had been inadequate.
209 
In the UK, an All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition and the Intelligence 
and Security Committee have investigated aspects of the UK government’s involvement in 
extraordinary renditions. The British government admitted in early 2008 that it had allowed CIA 
rendition flights to pass through UK jurisdictions, despite multiple previous denials.
210 
Subsequently, the 2007 Human Rights Annual Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee has recommended that the government demand more answers from the US on the 
details of these flights.
211 
6.2  The Canadian commissions of inquiry 
With the European context in mind, we can now turn to the more technical details of the two 
Canadian inquiries. These two inquiries and the commission of inquiry model in general provide 
much opportunity for debate and discussion concerning the virtues of and problems with 
commissions of inquiry. This section attempts to survey of some of the complex issues that can 
arise in investigations like those carried out by Commissioners O’Connor and Iacobucci, 
especially when issues of national security confidentiality are present. 
Despite different mandates and structures, both the O’Connor and Iacobucci inquiries were 
commissions of inquiry. Both were launched by the Canadian government and both were 
empowered to conduct independent, thorough investigations. Macklin (2008) has described 
inquiries as lying “somewhere between the internal government investigation and the trial”.
212 
Commissions of inquiry are investigative tools that have often been used in Canada: including 
provincial commissions, there have been over 400 since confederation in 1867.
213 Commissions 
are appointed through a cabinet order and report to the government. They can take many 
different forms:
214 they may have a single or multiple commissioners; they may be public or 
private; they may have a mandate to find facts, make recommendations or both; and given the 
flexibility commissioners typically have in establishing procedures and rules, inquiries can 
generally be set up to suit to the task at hand. In addition, based on the legislative framework 
surrounding inquiries in Canada, commissioners have the power to compel participation and the 




                                                      
209 International Commission of Jurists (2008b). 
210 See “Gulp! Britain backtracks, admits US rendition flights”, neurope.eu, 25 February 2008 (retrieved 
from http://www.neurope.eu/articles/83093.php).  
211 UK Parliament, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report: Human Rights Annual 
Report 2007, Session 2007–08, London, 20 July 2008, p. 23 para. 47 (retrieved from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/533/53302.htm). 
212 Macklin (2008), p. 21. 
213 John H. Gomery, “The Pros and Cons of Commissions of Inquiry”, (2006) McGill LJ 783 at 786–87.  
214 Gus Van Harten, “Truth before Punishment: A Defence of Public Inquiries”, (2003) 29 Queen’s LJ 242 
at 246. 
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6.2.1 Benefits 
The experiences of the O’Connor and Iacobucci inquiries illustrate some of the advantages of 
using the inquiry system. First, inquiries can be more flexible in structure than a trial, which can 
be helpful in a number of respects.
216 For instance, inquiries may proceed in instances where 
trials may not get off the ground: the lack of information from the US, Egypt, Syria and 
Malaysia constrained the findings in the Iacobucci inquiry, but the commissioner was not 
hamstrung by this lack of cooperation and was still able to proceed and make important 
findings.
217 Furthermore, this flexibility allows commissioners to adapt certain procedures as 
required by the case at hand. For instance, as Macklin (2008) notes, lawyers working for the 
O’Connor inquiry were entrusted with the job of testing the evidence given by the government at 
in camera hearings where Mr Arar and his counsel were not present.
218 Without this cross-
examination, Commissioner O’Connor states that he would not have been able to report with 
confidence.
219  
Second, inquiries are an opportunity to benefit from the experience of many talented individuals. 
To begin with, experienced judges – sitting or retired – can be used as commissioners. As Roach 
(2008) notes, the contribution made to the review process by judges in Canada is a noteworthy 
aspect of the Canadian experience.
220 Both Justice O’Connor and Justice Iacobucci are highly 
respected individuals, which helps inspire confidence and authority in their respective inquiries. 
Justice O’Connor had previously acted as a commissioner on another high profile inquiry, and 
he has been praised for his “skill, wisdom and tact”.
221 Nigel Marshman, former commission 
counsel on the O’Connor inquiry, emphasises that the courage and persistence with which 
Commissioner O’Connor handled the difficult claims of national security confidentiality was 
essential to the effectiveness of that inquiry.
222 
In addition, inquiries are able to draw on the expertise of many experts and as such have made 
significant contributions of important original, primary research that “adds to both scholarship 
and public enlightenment”.
223 This aspect was particularly evident in the O’Connor inquiry, 
where the policy review included a survey of national security history and competencies in 
Canada.
224 The involvement of highly regarded and experienced individuals also lends 
                                                      
216 O’Connor and Kristjanson (2007). 
217 Iacobucci (2008), pp. 339–40. 
218 See Macklin (2008), pp. 25 and 30; see also the O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), 
pp. 291–93. As discussed further below, however, the potential flexibility allowed to commissions of 
inquiry goes only as far as the commission’s governing mandate allows. All possible flexibility can be of 
little help in relation to certain national security confidentiality concerns. Nor is this a one-size-fits-all 
technique, as lawyers for Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin demonstrated at the Iacobucci inquiry 
(October Submission of the Applicants, 2007, paras. 11–12). 
219 “When I reflect on the nature of the issues raised by the mandate for the Inquiry and the type of 
evidence I heard, I recognize that I could not have reported with confidence if the witnesses heard in 
camera had not been cross-examined” (O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations, 2006b, p. 292). 
220 Roach (2007), p. 65. 
221 Gomery (2006), p. 793. 
222 Derived from the interview with Nigel Marshman, supra note 93. 
223 Whitaker (2008), p. 28. 
224 For example, a list of experts used by Iacobucci includes  
Professor Peter Burns of the University of British Columbia, the former Chair of the United 
Nations Committee against Torture, who provided advice concerning matters relating to 
mistreatment and possible torture; Paul Heinbecker, former Canadian Ambassador and 
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credibility to the process. For instance, Commissioner O’Connor retained Reid Morden, former 
director of CSIS and a top public servant with the Department of Foreign Affairs to assist in 
decisions relating to the public disclosure of information.
225 Moreover, during inquiries, many 
different parties may become participants or interveners and crucially receive funding to 
facilitate their participation.
226  
Third, if conducted and structured properly, inquiries can minimise the duplication of work on 
related subjects. For instance, Commissioner Iacobucci was able to use the evidence and 
findings of the O’Connor inquiry where appropriate. The Iacobucci inquiry also benefited from 
some of the guidance created on the issue of national security confidentiality through the 
litigation that occurred at the end of the O’Connor inquiry. The government had wanted to redact 
certain portions of Commissioner O’Connor’s reports for national security reasons, a decision 
that Commissioner O’Connor disagreed with.
227 The dispute was resolved in Federal Court, and 
the public judgment contained an analysis of the test to be employed in such a determination 
under the Canada Evidence Act, which Commissioner Iacobucci took under advisement in his 
own determinations.
228 Furthermore, the Iacobucci and O’Connor inquiries can be placed 
alongside the Major inquiry, the latter having examined the circumstances surrounding the 
bombing of Air India flight 182 (which killed all 392 onboard) and made findings and 
recommendations pertaining to law enforcement and intelligence gathering in Canada.
229 All 
three inquiries dealt with security issues, but in different ways according to their mandates. As 
Whitaker (2008) writes, the Iacobucci inquiry had a limited scope, the Air India inquiry focused 
on events that occurred over 20 years ago and the O’Connor inquiry “point[ed] one way 
forward”.
230 Yet these three inquiries, in addition to the review and studies done in the past 
couple of years relating specifically to the RCMP,
231 provide any government with a will to act 
with a wealth of information on Canada’s national security practices, past and present. 
Finally, a thorough, legitimate, fair investigation can go a long way to restoring public faith in 
government and its institutions. As asserted above in section 4 on costs, the reputation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
is the Director of the Laurier Centre for Global Relations, and Distinguished Fellow, 
International Relations, at the independent research Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, and who provided advice on certain DFAIT- and national security-related 
matters; Raymond Protti, a former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 
who provided advice on certain national security-related matters; and Dr. Lisa Ramshaw of 
the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto, a forensic psychiatrist who provided 
advice concerning certain medical information that the Inquiry obtained relating to Mr 
Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin. (Iacobucci, 2008, p. 51, para. 1) 
See also the discussion in Whitaker (2008), p. 27. 
225 The author would like to thank Nigel Marshman for drawing attention to this point (in the interview 
with Nigel Marshman, supra note 93). See also the O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 
301. 
226 See Iacobucci (2008), p. 30 para. 5 and pp. 51–52, para. 3 (for distinctions among interveners, those 
with a concern about the subject matter of the inquiry and whose participation could provide assistance to 
the inquiry and participants, and those with substantial and direct interest in the content of the inquiry). 
227 The dispute was over approximately 1,500 words (Canada (Attorney General) v. Commission of 
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher Arar, 2007 FC 766 at para. 13). 
228 Iacobucci (2008), p. 59, para. 36. 
229 For more information, see the website for the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the 
Bombing of Air India flight 182 (http://www.majorcomm.ca).  
230 Whitaker (2008), p. 38. 
231 See Public Safety Canada (2008a), supra note 65 and the Task Force on Governance and Cultural 
Change in the RCMP (2007), supra note 66.  38 | LINDSAY AAGAARD 
 
country and its institutions has suffered as a result of what was learned about the treatment of Mr 
Arar, Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin. When commissions of inquiry are conducted in 
public, they are, as Macklin (2008) writes, both a “means and end”; they advance “the principles 
that justice must not only be done, but must be seen  to be done”.
232 Inquiries that are not 




First, one of the largest challenges faced by the two inquiries pertains to the difficulties posed by 
claims of national security confidentiality. The challenge of dealing with evidence that the 
government insists should be assessed in private is one about which Macklin (2008) has written 
“besets virtually all post-9/11 legal and quasi-legal processes involving issues of terrorism and 
national security”.
234 Although the Canadian inquiries demonstrate that national security 
concerns should not be an excuse for declining to investigate,
235 both inquiries have grappled 
with the same challenges faced by many European investigations in determining how to fulfil 
their mandates in the face of concerns about confidentiality for national security.
236  
How governments choose to deal with the problem of sensitive information in the inquiry 
context has an effect on the overall efficacy of the inquiry itself. In his first report, 
Commissioner O’Connor recounted his experience in the Walkerton inquiry, and stated that in 
order for an inquiry to be effective, it should possess several essential qualities, including 
publicity and transparency.
237 Yet, during inquiries where concerns about national security 
confidentiality are a reality (which can lead to in camera meetings, redacted reports or 
predominantly private proceedings), it becomes especially difficult – if not impossible – to 
ensure these characteristics are present.  
Both inquiries developed practices and procedures to help them deal with evidence that the 
government insisted be kept secret. Commissioner O’Connor released two versions of the factual 
report, but the one released to the public – even before the litigation on national security claims – 
contained over 99% of the information contained in the confidential report.
238 He gave extensive 
consideration to the issue of national security claims, and Rules of Procedure and Practice were 
developed for dealing with evidence over which the government claimed national security 
confidentiality.
239 As was mentioned, Commission counsel was used for cross-examinations 
during in camera meetings, which Commissioner O’Connor writes assists in addressing some of 
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evidence divulged in camera that is not disclosed to the person most affected or subject to cross-
examination by counsel for that person?” (Macklin, 2008, p. 24). 
235 Marty (2007), para. 329. 
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recommendation that the results of government investigations should be made public (European 
Parliament, 2007, para. 185). 
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238 See the case Canada (Attorney General) v. Commission of Inquiry, supra note 227, para. 13. 
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the “understandable” concerns of affected individuals and the public about the use of in camera 
meetings.
240 Under the rules, Commissioner O’Connor also appointed an amicus curiae to test 
the government’s assertions of national security confidentiality.
241 Still, very telling of the 
difficulties presented by the claims of national security confidentiality and the hindrance these 
can cause was Commissioner O’Connor’s recommendation that the cases of Mr Almalki, Mr 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin be examined, but that the required inquiry be internal rather than 
public.
242  
The Iacobucci inquiry has been the recipient of some harsh criticism in relation to the way it 
handled issues of national security confidentiality. Rules of Procedure and Practice were 
adopted,
243 and two reports were released – one for the government and one for public disclosure 
that has approximately 20% fewer words.
244 The Iacobucci inquiry was intended to be an 
internal inquiry, however, and so from its inception the public and participants were less 
informed of the proceedings and testimony than had been the case in the public O’Connor 
inquiry. Commissioner Iacobucci was specifically directed in the terms of reference to “take all 
steps necessary to ensure that the inquiry is conducted in private” except where public hearings 
were required for the fulfilment of his mandate.
245 The British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association was harshly critical of the predominantly private proceedings, believing that a secret 
process is fundamentally “at odds” with the “truth-seeking function of public inquiries”.
246 The 
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association ultimately withdrew from the inquiry, citing its 
concern that continued participation as an intervener would contribute to the establishment of a 
“dangerous precedent” of closed-door inquiries.
247  
Moreover, counsel for Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati Mr Nureddin and several interveners 
fundamentally disagreed with what they argued was an over-restrictive interpretation of the 
mandate by the Iacobucci inquiry.
248 Indeed, one of the consequences of the restrictive approach 
of an ‘internal’ inquiry is that the three men ostensibly at the centre of the inquiries were greatly 
limited in their ability to participate. They argued that their ability to meet with the Commission 
counsel who would be questioning witnesses in camera – a process that was used in the 
O’Connor inquiry – was of little use to them, given the real lack of information available on 
these witnesses.
249 This is a problem familiar to some European states, and Amnesty 
                                                      
240 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 293. 
241 Ibid., pp. 277–78. 
242 Iacobucci interpreted O’Connor’s words as suggesting that when national security issues are involved, 
internal inquiries can be more appropriate than public inquiries, which can prove “complicated, unduly 
protracted and expensive” (Iacobucci, 2008, p. 30, para. 3). 
243 Ibid., p. 31, para. 5. 
244 Ibid., p. 60, para. 41. 
245 See the Iacobucci Order-in-Council (2006).  
246 British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA), “Civil Rights Group Withdraws from Inquiry 
due to Concerns Over Secrecy of the Proceedings”, Press Release, BCCLA, Vancouver, 11 December 
2007 (retrieved from http://www.bccla.org/pressreleases/07Iacobuccinews.pdf). 
247 Ibid. This problem arose in the O’Connor inquiry as well, where Mr Arar was unable to participate in 
the in camera meetings because of his lack of appropriate security clearance (O’Connor Analysis and 
Recommendations, 2006b, pp. 285–86). 
248 See the October Submission of the Applicants (2007); see also BCCLA (2006). 
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International has criticised some European investigations for not allowing the victims or non-
governmental organisations to make submissions.
250  
Second, commissions of inquiries can be misused as political tools. Inquiries are many things: 
powerful instruments backed by legislation, budgets and pledges of cooperation; a means of 
generating useful research and recommendations after long and thoughtful study; and a way of 
providing for public participation and disclosure.
251 At the same time, they also have the 
potential for misuse as one of the many political tools at a government’s disposal. That is, 
launching a commission of inquiry can be used as an example of ‘action’ on the part of a 
government, when in reality the commission is merely the opening act if any institutional or 
policy reform is required. The work of inquiries can carry great credibility, but it would be a 
mistake to view this work – the reports and the investigation process itself – as the end of the 
process. As Commissioner O’Connor remarked recently, the role of commissioners and of 
inquiries stops when the report has been issued.
252 The implementation of policy 
recommendations is part of the political process and must be taken up by government. As 
Macklin (2008) has written in relation to the O’Connor inquiry: 
It seems ironic that the government of Canada appointed a public inquiry, only to cast a 
wide and heavy blanket of national security confidentiality over the process…A more 
cynical interpretation would be that the government was content to give the appearance 
of openness by appointing a public inquiry, while zealously pursuing the objective of 
minimizing disclosure through the legal position adopted by counsel during the inquiry 
itself.
253  
By appointing a public inquiry, a government is able temporarily to remove a difficult issue from 
its own agenda while appearing to take action.
254  
Third, although inquiries have the benefit of some procedural flexibility, the work of inquiries 
can nevertheless be hampered by a lack of cooperation from foreign governments. Inquiries in 
Canada have important powers to compel cooperation, but they remain dependent upon 
voluntary cooperation when it comes to information from foreign governments. This can have a 
detrimental effect on what inquiries are able to accomplish, as ultimately anything less than full 
and complete information will naturally limit the reach of an investigation. 
For example, Commissioner O’Connor was unable to draw a conclusion about whether the 
TECS
255 lookout request made by the RCMP had actually contributed to Mr Arar’s deportation 
because information from the Americans had not been forthcoming.
256 Furthermore, 
Commissioner Iacobucci was unable to reach a finding as to whether Canadian officials had 
contributed to Mr Almalki’s detention in Syria – as he had found had been the case with Mr 
Elmaati and Mr Nureddin – in “large part” because the governments of the US, Syria and 
Malaysia had not cooperated with the inquiry.
257 Although the RCMP had provided information 
                                                      
250 See the State of Denial report by Amnesty International (2008b), p. 27. 
251 “[P]ublic inquiries present a wonderful vehicle for broad public involvement and participation in issues 
of public policy. Indeed, I think this is one the great strengths of the inquiry process” (O’Connor and 
Kristjanson, 2007). 
252 Ibid. 
253 Macklin (2008), p. 25. 
254 Robert Centa and Patrick Macklem, “Securing Accountability through Commissions of Inquiry: A Role 
for the Law Commission of Canada” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 117 at 128. 
255 TECS refers to Treasury Enforcement Communications System used by US Customs. 
256 O’Connor Analysis and Recommendations (2006b), p. 14. 
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to Syria stating that Mr Almalki was an “imminent threat” and although Commissioner 
Iacobucci found that this information was inaccurate, inflammatory and shared without proper 
consideration of the consequences for Mr Almalki,
258 that was not enough. Owing to absent 
information from foreign governments, the information before the inquiry did not meet the 
threshold required for a finding that the Canadian officials had contributed to Mr Almalki’s 
detention. 
The lack of openness from foreign governments in the inquiry process is something that has 
been noted with great frustration by individuals such as Mr Marty and Mr Fava, as well as by 
Amnesty International. For instance, the lack of cooperation on the part of the Polish 
government meant that Mr Fava’s committee was unable to find the evidence necessary to state 
conclusively that an illegal detention centre was operating in Poland.
259 The lack of cooperation 
from American authorities and those in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has also 
hampered the work of prosecutors in Germany.
260 Ultimately, inquiries are only as effective as 
the information they are able to use.  
Consequently, when investigating cases involving multiple states, commissions of inquiry can be 
left in a position in which the cooperation of other states is crucial and yet impossible to demand. 
7. Conclusions 
This broad survey has aimed at providing those interested in government investigations into the 
torture and detention of their citizens abroad with some useful background. The post-9/11 
environment, in which inter-state and inter-agency cooperation has at times been preferred to the 
detriment of the security and rights of individuals, is a context that Canada and many European 
nations share.  
The Canadian experience reveals that there are costs associated with the involvement of state 
officials in the dubious treatment of citizens: costs for institutions, individuals and political 
parties. Furthermore, there is no doubt that investigations are an essential part of the 
accountability process, and that setting up a process that is independent, public and effective is a 
significant challenge. The O’Connor and Iacobucci inquiries are important not just because of 
the themes we can extract from their findings – themes relating to the sharing of information, the 
training of officials, the provision of consular services and other issues found in the experiences 
of many different countries. They are also important because of the way they sought to balance 
the elements required for a legitimate and successful inquiry with the demands of confidentiality 
for national security. 
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requesting further information on Mr Almalki, Mr Elmaati and Mr Nureddin. Commissioner Iacobucci 
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259 See the State of Denial report by Amnesty International (2008b), p. 7; see also Marty (2007), para. 3. 
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It must also be remembered that investigations are only one step in the accountability process. 
Recommendations and findings must be acted upon and proper redress made. In the European 
context, Amnesty International has pointed out that “the findings and recommendations of the 
investigations have been met with almost total silence and denial of responsibility”.
261 Although 
the Canadian government has apologised to Mr Arar, atonement has not been made to Mr 
Almalki, Mr Elmaati or Mr Nureddin. Both Canadian inquiries pointed out substantial flaws in 
practice and policy, and there is no shortage of guidance for any government willing to act. The 
current Conservative government has promised action, and Canadians are waiting for concrete 
details on implementation. And it remains that there is no excuse, not even that of national 
security confidentiality, for governments in Europe or Canada that fail to seek truth, 
accountability and reform. 
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